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The South African Mini-Bus taxi industry is rooted within the informal sector 
yet much of its profitability and survival has been forged and become 
entrenched by cultivating a presence within the formal economy. This dualism 
has created many internal pressures for this industry and many of these 
pressures have been associated with violence. This paper considers all these 
multi-faceted dimensions but also calls for the sector's incorporation and 
regulation into the formal economy. The theoretical foundations of regulation 
are explored and it is established that a non-regulatory regime leads to 
decreased service quality and worsened driver-working conditions. Before the 
regulatory policies are further examined, the paper establishes the growth of 
this industry, paying particular attention to the violence that has been a key 
feature to the industry. This analysis spans the period 1987 to 2000 and 
highlights the various dynamics that have led to this violence. Political 
motivations are a key factor but one fundamental issue is that of overtraded 
routes that has numerous negative spillovers. This overtrading is a direct 
result of the industry lacking a proper regulatory framework in which to 
operate. The paper uses a survey to examine the prevailing working 
conditions that are built upon a system of informality and highlights the need 
for intervention to support the plight of drivers who are exploited. Thereafter 
the current government interventions in place are examined with a further 
analysis on the effects of minimum wages. The paper then concludes by 
raising critical issues that the government must address effectively for this 
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The paper begins by defining the informal sector but it also advances the 
proposition that the dualistic nature of the taxi industry cannot survive in the 
long term. Thereafter, the concept of regulation is defined, the ways in which 
this can be implemented are highlighted and the changing theories that have 
been associated with this over the last few decades are examined. The 
differing hypotheses for these theories are put forward and relevant criticisms 
are highlighted. The argument is then extended by focusing on the South 
African experience, followed by the international experience. The overall 
impression is that the taxi industry does not thrive in an unregulated 
environment as an oversupply of operators results in excessive cost-cutting 
measures. Firstly, service quality deteriorates as maintenance becomes 
neglected and secondly, drivers are exploited. Drivers are made to work 
under pressure for very long hours and for limited financial remuneration. 
The paper then analyses the events that have led up to the point where 
government intervention has become a necessity. The story begins in 1987 
when the industry undergoes rapid deregulation and where permits are issued 
with little regard to the effects of oversupply_ The effects are shrinking profits 
and violence soon ensues as different groups compete for passengers and 
control over specific routes. Khosa (1992), Dugard (2001) and others offer an 
in depth insight into the exact ramifications of overtraded routes as well as the 
political motivations that shaped the violence of this period. Having examined 
the historical background of the industry, the paper continues by assessing 
the current status of this industry. 
What follows is a snapshot of the transport industry as a whole, which 
contributes roughly 10% to the country's gross domestic product. This 
account then offers a brief breakdown of the rail and bus systems in order to 
elicit a better understanding of where the taxi industry fits in the broader 
transportation industry. Thereafter a Survey of wages and employment 
conditions in the taxi industry is used to glean relevant information on the 











survey serves to prove that indeed, mini-bus taxi drivers are exploited by 
working very long hours (up to 19 hours), six to seven days a week for a 
median monthly wage of R1200. This section emphasises the plight of these 
drivers who have to endure harsh working conditions and are denied key 
benefits like access to pension funds, medical aid and unemployment 
insurance. 
In terms of the regulatory challenges, the obvious step is to examine what the 
government has been doing in order to alleviate the problems in the industry. 
The government's regulatory initiative focuses on formalising, legalising and 
recapitalising the industry. The progress of these initiatives is examined and 
the recapitalisation process is critically analysed from various perspectives. 
This process intends to introduce 18- and 35- seater mini-buses as we" as 
introduce a number of regulatory reforms that may see a number of drivers 
being unemployed. This process may lead to the disemployment of up to a 
third of the drivers currently employed. It is stated that these drivers will be re-
absorbed in different capacities within the industry but no concrete steps are 
mentioned on how this will be done. 
The issue of disemployment is discussed again when this paper considers the 
effects of minimum wages, as the government intends to promulgate a 
sectoral determination on appropriate wages and conditions of employment. 
What is found is that in the short run, modest disemployment effects can be 
expected with a minimum wage of R1800, but in the long run, disemployment 
may reach 33%. The concluding section highlights issues that the government 
must still address, especially disemployment, which may occur through the 
introduction of minimum wages or directly through the recapitalisation 
process. 
The first chapter thus deals with the dynamics of the informal sector. The 
second chapter then deals with the differing aspects associated with 
regulation. This chapter begins by examining the theoretical considerations of 
regulation, then it looks at the South African experience and concludes with a 











growth of this industry, paying particular attention to the various sources of 
violence that have been associated with it. The fourth chapter examines the 
South African transport sector and engages in an involved account of the 
prevailing working conditions in the mini-bus taxi industry. The fifth and final 
chapter examines the initiatives that the government has introduced and also 
provides a sobering account of possible wage and employment trade-ofts. 
The paper then ends with a conclusion, which draws and highlights a number 
of key issues and considerations. 
As a site of investigation, the mini-bus taxi industry constitutes a fascinating 
phenomenon of a transitional sector finding its proper place in a transitional 
society. The South African society is undergoing a social, economic and legal 
transformation, whereas further to this, the mini-bus taxi industry is 
undergoing a transition that will shed it of its informality and channel it into the 
mainstream economy. A process of this complex nature will invariably see 
some progress, ruptures and backward movements while heroics; defeats, 
optimism and pessimism will permeate throughout this intricate process. This 
thesis attempts to capture and explore some of these dynamics but it must be 












1. THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The notion of the informal sector is one that lacks a standard definition but a 
number of authors have attempted to define this. Cross (2000) states that it is 
typically defined as otherwise legal economic activity that takes place outside 
the realm of state regulatory practices. Rogerson (2000) offers a somewhat 
different definition as he states that the informal economy consists of 
enterprises that are not registered for tax purposes. This author draws a 
distinction by stating that the type of enterprise can be 'survivalist' in nature or 
a 'growth/micro-enterprise'. The South African minibus taxi industry has by 
and large not conformed to state regulatory practices and taxi operators have 
paid very limited taxes. But what is key about this industry is that it is a growth 
enterprise. What Rogerson (2000) means by a growth enterprise, is typically 
an enterprise that lacks formality in terms of business licenses, accounting 
procedures and generally requires rudimentary business skills but has the 
potential to flourish into a larger formal small business endeavor. 
The informal sector has developed because the formal sector has been 
unable to absorb the country's labour force. Gallin (2001) states that it is still 
widely assumed that the informal sector is a transitory phenomenon and that it 
will be absorbed by the formal sector in time. This assumption is made with 
the belief that there is no need for action from trade unions or the government. 
What this author states is that this assumption is unrealistic and fosters 
dangerous complacency as the experience of the last two decades has 
proved it wrong. Capozzola (1991) highlights that informal sector enterprises 
face severe limitation, which keeps the businesses small and unable to 
achieve bigger, more cost-effective scales of production. One of the 
limitations stems from the fact that the informal sector operates largely without 
significant collateral and this denies them access to formal sector capital. 
However, Rogerson (2000) extends this and states that three other key 
limitations exist. These include inadequacies in the content and delivery of 
education and training; business infrastructure and service provision as well 











All of the issues that are raised are indeed critical and directly affect the 
minibus taxi industry. Schoombee (2000) states that the very high interest 
rates charged by informal sector lenders relative to formal sector loans is 
indicative of the extent to which demand for informal sector funds exceeds the 
supply. This is then seen as evidence of formal market failure. The obvious 
question is why formal sector financial and lending institutions are reluctant to 
finance growth enterprises in the informal sector. Schoombee (2000) 
highlights four reasons for this. Firstly, there is a high risk of default and this is 
due to the unavailability of conventional forms of collateral. There is also the 
issue of high costs associated with screening applicants, the low returns that 
banks face when transacting with the informal sector and the fourth point that 
Schoombee (2000) mentions is the problem that those in the informal sector 
have when dealing with formal financial institutions. These include amongst 
others, language and cultural barriers. 
It is ironic that the South African minibus taxi industry came about mainly as a 
reaction to government restrictions during the apartheid era. This occurred 
since government developed townships outside the urban centres and thus 
many people needed affordable transport to and from the cities. In fact, 
Capozzola (1991) states that townships on the Cape Flats, outside Cape 
Town, had an estimated population of 750 000 but all of these people were 
served by one train line. At the time, fares were R 1.20 for a third class trip 
from Langa to Cape Town and there were only a limited number of train 
journeys available each day. Minibus taxis then entered the market and their 
average fares were RO.50 per trip and Capozzola (1991) continues to state 
that by 1990, the volume capacity and departure frequency of minibus 
services had far outstripped that of the railways. 
For the masses, the taxi industry has largely served their transport link to the 
formal sector. This industry operates with its roots in the informal sector but 
much of its profitability and survival is entrenched within the formal economy. 
It is an industry that adheres to some rules and regulations but not to others. 
Taxis must adhere to traffic laws and regulations or face penalties but a large 











labour standards that are practiced are at best dubious and standard 
accounting practices are not followed. This informal industry is also in direct 
competition for revenues with regulated formal industries like the railways and 
bus industries. But unlike the latter regulated industries, in the taxi industry 
wages are low and uncertain and there is no effective social wage in place to 
protect workers. With excessive competition, violence has erupted and profits 
have shrinked. 
This paper intends to show that the minibus taxi industry, which has strong 
ties with both the formal and informal sector, has failed to operate without 
regulation. The time may be appropriate to formalise this industry and then 
unlock large rewards for the stakeholders. Operating within the informal sector 
and within the periphery of the formal sector has led to much chaos and the 
challenge is to regulate the industry and to bring it in line with the formal 
sector where the rules and regulations that are to be followed will undoubtedly 











2. THE DIFFERING ASPECTS ASSOCIATED WITH REGULATION 
2.1. THEORETICAL ISSUES CONCERNING REGULATION 
At present the taxi industry is largely unregulated and the national government 
intends on regulating this industry. Before exploring the intentions of 
government, it is critical to first understand what regulation is and thus its 
implications. Let us begin by attempting to define this concept. Kip Viscusi et 
al (1998:309) define regulation as 'a state imposed limitation on the discretion 
that may be exercised by individuals or organisations, which is supported by 
the threat of sanction'. The United Nations report (2001) offers a more intuitive 
definition. It is stated that regulation is the sustained and focused control 
normally exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a 
community. Thus, regulation can either prevent undesirable behaviour or 
enable and facilitate desirable actions. 
Kip Viscusi et al (1998) state that economic regulation can restrict firms on a 
number of decisions, but the three key economic variables controlled by 
regulation are price, quantity and entry into and out of markets 1. The first 
major theory propagating the implementation of regulation is the public 
interest theory, which views the government as benevolent and thus looking 
out for the well being of the citizens. Consequently, if market failures occur, 
the government must step in to soothe these problems in response to public 
demand. Kip Viscusi et al (1998) state that this theory is now referred to as 
normative analysis as a positive theory (NPT). The major criticisms that the 
authors put forward are that empirical evidence has not supported this theory. 
Therefore, this theory is really a hypothesis, as it does not generate the 
testable prediction that regulation takes place to correct a market failure but 
rather it assumes it to be the case. 
The second major theory concerned with the implementation of regulation is 
referred to as the 'Capture theory'. Kip Viscusi et al (1998) state that this 
theory is premised on the fact that the agency that is meant to regulate an 












industry is 'captured' by that industry and the dominant groups within it. This 
then implies that regulation promotes industry profit rather than social welfare 
as interest groups struggle amongst themselves to maximize the incomes of 
their members. Kang (1998) affirms that regulation of the taxi industry is 
always vulnerable to capture by the industry, which may lead to higher fares 
and fewer taxis in operation. Kip Viscusi et al (1998) criticise this theory by 
stating that it has no theoretical underpinnings, as it does not explain how 
regulation comes to be controlled by the industry and proponents of the theory 
have not advanced sufficient evidence to support the theory. 
Stigler's economic theory of regulation represents the third theoretical 
orientation that can be deployed to understand the regulation of an industry 
such as the mini-bus taxi industry. This theory contends that businesses and 
politicians are assumed to be self-interested income-maximisers who are not 
concerned with the public interest. Regulation is favoured as it decreases 
competition and thus maximises economic rents. The theory was later 
extended by Peltzman (in Kip Viscusi et ai, 1998) and highlights that individual 
consumers (of which a large number exist) have little to lose from anti-
competitive behaviour but producers (who are few in number) reap large 
benefits. Nonetheless Kip Viscusi et al (1998) maintain that while this theory is 
an important advancement in understanding government intervention, the 
provision of sufficient empirical evidence still remains a weakness to the 
theoretical propositions that it advances. 
There are a number of economic arguments for regulation and Turnbull 
(1999) identifies the most important of these. Firstly, regulation can be used 
when the state wants to ensure guaranteed provision of a good where 
ordinarily, the market would not offer this or where there is market failure. 
Another argument centres on curbing power of dominant forces in the market, 
thus decreasing consumer surpluses and correcting for negative externalities. 
The last two arguments are premised on eliminating information deficiencies 
thus decreasing the transaction costs that would occur and also curbing 
excessive competition. Excessive competition leads to situation where costs 











investment. The social arguments are concerned with ensuring employment 
security, viable working conditions and service quality. For Turnbull (1999) 
deregulation has a detrimental impact on workers' terms and conditions of 
employment as labour costs become the target of cost-cutting initiatives. Thus 
regulation seeks to promote both efficiency and equity. This author proceeds 
by stating that to correct market failures, two different modes of regulation can 
be deployed: namely structure and conduct regulation. Structural regulation is 
intended to remove incentives and opportunities for undesirable behaviour 
while conduct regulation centres on how to deal with the undesirable 
behaviour that arises in industry. 
This is not to say that regulation has not been heavily criticized, as some 
schools of thought believe that this market intervention worsens the effects of 
the original market failure. Furthermore, these criticisms assert that regulation 
benefits those being regulated, in the sense that since they have some form 
of protection from the government, inefficiency occurs and there is no 
incentive to innovate. Melton (1978) forwards the argument that regulation 
breeds unemployment because limitations are placed on the entry of new 
firms to a particular economic sector. This emphasizes the point that Douglas 
(1999) makes, namely that only regulated firms benefit from the process of 
regulation. This occurs since regulation creates rents for the regulated 
industry, which are paid for by consumers and of which the politicians get a 
portion in the form of contributions from the regulated firms. 
In light of the plethora of economic and policy criticisms that I have alluded to 
with respect to regulatory interventions in a market economy, I now direct my 
attention in this dissertation to understanding the implications and impact that 











2.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE OF REGULATION 
Having reviewed the background theory, it is important to contextualise and 
analyse the South African situation. Rapp (1993) states that in South Africa, 
regulation of the transport industry began in the 1920s and 1930s. The author 
continues to state that the reason for this regulation was premised on the fact 
that an unregulated market was thought to generate an output larger than was 
optimal and without the state's intervention, the market was considered 
incapable of correcting this problem by itself. During the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, the world was in recession where structural unemployment had 
increased dramatically and employment was scarce. Rapp (1993) contends 
that since entering the transport industry required a relatively affordable 
outlay, many new entrants of whom a large number were relatively small 
operators entered the market. The effect of this process led to increased price 
competition, deteriorating profitability and deteriorating safety standards. Kip 
Viscusi et al (199B) confirms that in the United States, local government 
started placing restrictions on entry into the taxicab industry for the 
aforementioned reason. 
One has to question why operators continued to pursue this market, as surely 
decreasing profitability will render others bankrupt thus decreasing supply, 
increasing prices and benefiting the existing operators who are now faced 
with less competition. Rapp (1993) offers two explanations for this happening. 
Firstly, those exiting the market on account of bankruptcy would then sell their 
vehicles at attractive rates and thus another new entrant to the industry would 
snap the vehicle up in the hope of enjoying more success than his 
predecessor. Secondly, the demand for transport is characteristic of peak 
hours in the mornings and in the evenings. At these peak times, there are 
never enough taxis to accommodate all the commuters, thus other 
entrepreneurs see a window of opportunity and engage in this industry. What 
is critical to remember though is that during off peak times demand is 











In the 1960s and 1970s, the rationale for regulation became somewhat 
altered. Rapp (1993) states that it was argued that an unregulated market 
would generate an outcome such that the needs of the old, the young and the 
handicapped would not be met. This approach, which is a restatement of the 
public interest theory that was discussed above, entails government granting 
subsidies to operators ply routes that are otherwise considered unprofitable. 
Furthermore, Rapp (1993) produces a case study focusing on the Mowbray 
taxi rank in the Western Cape. The author concludes that for minibus taxi 
drivers, deregulation has meant increased employment, exploitative labour 
practices, extended working hours and a reduction in remuneration. Turnbull 
(1999) reiterates this pOint by stating that the impact of deregulation on 
transport workers is almost universally negative. For the taxi owners, there 
have been new entrants into the industry and the overall result is increased 
competition and declines in profitability. The author's closing remark is that 
the situation that has developed is very similar to that of the 1920s and 1930s 
prior to the introduction of regulation. Turnbull (1999) contends that 
deregulation which increases competition is meant to lead to lower costs and 
fares, higher productivity and service levels, service innovation and greater 
levels of investment. 
In the South African context this has definitely not been that case. Kang 
(1998) states that the taxi industry is highly labour-intensive and the labour 
cost usually exceeds more that 50% of the operating costs. In a highly 
competitive environment, the firm can increase profitability by increasing 
productivity or cutting costs. In terms of cutting costs, labour and vehicle 
maintenance costs are the first to be affected by such economic imperatives. 
The net effect of this is that working conditions for drivers will invariably 
decline and the maintenance of the vehicle will be neglected. When 
considering increasing productivity, the result here is that drivers must drive 
faster, cram in as many people in the vehicle as possible and ensure that 
'pirate2, drivers do not 'steal' their potential commuters. The overall effect is 











that drivers are under pressure and underpaid; reckless driving and iII-
maintained vehicles are a traffic hazard to all motorists and pedestrians and 
finally commuters are treated badly, being forced to sit uncomfortably and 
being subjected to maniac driving that puts their lives at risk as well. 
Turnbull (1999) emphasizes that regulation rather than competition is widely 
regarded as the guarantor for sustainable development. Perhaps then it is 
safe to agree that the government has chosen the right initiative to correct the 
problems prevailing within the taxi industry. But this does not end here. There 
are numerous issues to be ironed out before sustainable development is 
achieved. Having examined the South African experience, it is important to 











2.3 THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF REGULATION 
This section is intended to briefly examine the effects of both regulation and 
deregulation in a number of different countries. What must be noted though is 
that there cannot be a perfect comparison as the elements of the South 
African minibus taxi industry have some unique characteristics. Our starting 
point will be to examine the taxicab industry. 
Kang (1998) begins his analysis by looking at the USA, where partial or whole 
scale deregulation occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. The effects of 
deregulation of the taxicab industry in New York City were not pleasing as 
fares rose steadily, the quality of service deteriorated and the working 
conditions of drivers generally worsened as their incomes were reduced and 
their working hours were lengthened. In addition, Kang (1998) focuses on the 
mini-cab industries in San Diego and Seattle, which had become deregulated. 
In both cities, deregulation created severe bottlenecks to commuter service 
and operator sustainability. What is established is that in the mid 1980s, San 
Diego re- imposed entry restrictions and maximum fare rates because fares 
had increased and there was a continual turnover of small operators. Similar 
results were found in Seattle as the turnover of operators also increased and 
so did the waiting time by operators for passengers. The level of service also 
dropped and this was made clear through the discourteous service that 
passengers received and also the fights that occurred as a result of 
competition. In 1984, deregulation was deemed a failure and entry restrictions 
and price controls were reinstated. 
In the United Kingdom, where the Transport Act of 1985 allowed for the partial 
deregulation of entry into this industry, Kang (1998) establishes that quality 
enforcement was poor and fewer ranks were provided for the taxis. This 
author also finds that the Swedish experience was not positive as complaints 
increased and the quality of drivers worsened. This may have been as a result 
of the fact that the drivers' working hours were lengthened and commission 
wages were introduced. Similar results were experienced in New Zealand. 











quality of drivers worsened. In Australia deregulation resulted in waiting time 
being slightly reduced but wages were reduced by 13% during the period 
1987 - 1996. Finally, in his analysis of the Japanese experience of 
deregulation, Kang (1998) finds that drivers' incomes were lowered while their 
working hours were lengthened. 
The international experience strongly suggests that deregulation has not been 
successful and thus there are indeed pertinent lessons that South Africa can 
learn from this. Let us now closely examine why the South African industry 
was initially deregulated and establish if the effects have been as negative as 











3. THE GROWTH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINIBUS T AXIINDUSTRY 
The rise of the taxi industry was once hailed as the mechanism through which 
Africans could truly empower and enrich themselves. A gap in the market was 
identified and shrewd businessmen were able to reap financial rewards. But 
this initial period of prosperity did not last indefinitely. In the last fifteen years, 
this unprecedented growth has been marred by much violence, losses in 
profitability, deteriorating service quality and unsatisfactory working 
conditions. Our analysis will start at the very beginning in order to understand 
the current state of affairs. 
The apartheid government's policies meant that many Africans lived in 
townships far from their workplaces and it was common to spend many hours 
traveling as well as 20% of one's salary on transportation costs3. Prior to 
1987, transportation was through the use of state owned buses or trains. The 
government ensured that these modes of transport were well subsidized and 
heavily regulated. The Motor Carrier Transportation Act of 1930 made it 
virtually impossible for Africans to obtain permits for the transportation of 
passengers or goods for profit and 90% of taxi permit applications by Africans 
were rejected4 • This meant that only a few taxi operators could reap large 
profits but the majority of the population was excluded from such economic 
activities. 
It was only in 1987 with the release of the White Paper on Transport Policy 
that the deregulation of the taxi industry began. This White Paper argued for 
the promotion of the minibus taxi industry and consequently the legalisation of 
the 16-seater minibuses. There was then an unprecedented number of 
permits that were granted. In fact, Khosa (1992) states that in 1986/87, the 
number of licenses issued rose from 7093 to 34378 in the Johannesburg area 
alone . 
.J Dugard 200 I 











Before we proceed to analysing the effects of this sudden deregulation, it is 
important to examine the structure of this industry. The participants in this 
industry are mainly the taxi-driver, the owner-driver and the fleet owner. The 
fleet owners normally employ taxi-drivers while the owner-drivers own the 
vehicle and do the driving themselves. The owner-drivers have aspirations of 
owning more vehicles, employing drivers to operate them and eventually 
become fleet owners. In general, remuneration for taxi drivers is calculated 
according to a set daily target. The drivers are then paid the excess of this 
target. Khosa (1992) states that the most important people at taxi ranks are 
the queue marshals/rank managers. They log the arrival and departure of 
taxis and their main aim is to ensure that all drivers get an equal share of the 
business. Dugard (2001) contends that taxi associations have developed as 
informal agents of regulation, protection and in some cases agents of 
extortion. Taxi owners are members of these associations and are then 
subject to the route specifications as established by the association. 
When this industry was deregulated in 1987, many retrenched individuals and 
entrepreneurs decided to apply for permits and participate with the intention of 
making large profits. What invariably happened is that there was an 
oversupply of taxis on the road and each operator's share of commuter traffic 
began to shrink. This market saturation meant that it was increasingly harder 
for the drivers to meet their targets on their set routes and the incessant 
competition between different groupings and associations in the sector 
gradually spiraled into violent confrontations. These ensuing encounters 











3.1 THE ROOTS OF TAXI VIOLENCE I: 1987 - 1994 
At the time of deregulation, taxis were held as the pride of black economic 
achievement within the communities they served. The taxi industry was now 
beginning to constitute itself as an important cog in the overall South African 
transport system. The incremental and systematic growth in the commuter 
traffic borne by the industry served as an eloquent testimony to this process. 
Commuters could now arrive at work timeously and operators played a 
significant role in terms of social responsibility. According to Khosa (1992), 
several local taxi associations introduced a policy of transporting pensioners 
and elderly people for free. Some provided this free service to the 
handicapped and school pupils as well. In the period 1987-1994, this industry 
also played a role in the political struggle and transformation. Khosa (1992) 
continues to state that during boycotts of white-owned buses, taxi operators 
and boycott committees would negotiate reduced fares and rally taxis from 
elsewhere to ensure that sufficient transport was provided for the people. 
Dugard (2001) writes that this sudden deregulation by the government was an 
attempt to quell the revolutionary mood of Africans. The intent was to improve 
the image of the apartheid government by creating a Black middle class; the 
assumption being that this would stifle overt opposition. At an operational 
level, the cycle of growth, which was regarded as being inexorable was 
gradually reaching a limit: too many permits were issued and this over-issuing 
of permits led to corruption, the entrant of pirateS operators and intensive 
competition, which resulted in much violence over routes. With all these new 
entrants, numerous associations were formed and they 'used exploitation and 
coercion to build lucrative empires-cum-protection-rackets6,. Dugard (2001) 
continues to state that without government regulation, operators joined forces 
to form local taxi associations, which regulated loading practices and prices. 
They soon resorted to violent methods to extract incomes and 'protect' routes. 
5 Since the authorities did not perform checks on the running of this industry, many operators entered 
illegally (i.e. did not apply for permits) and further saturated the market. Dugard 2001 











This violence was most particular to the late apartheid era (1990-1992) and 
Dugard (2001) specifically analyses the Cape Peninsula taxi war of this 
period. The writer states that this violence was related to commercial 
competition over routes between two main associations, the LAGUNYA7 and 
the WEBTA8 associations. The war between these two associations ended in 
March of 1992, when these two bodies merged to form CODETA9 . Dugard 
(2001) emphasises that the late-apartheid taxi violence was heavily 
connected with transition politics but the major determinant is seen to be the 
rapid deregulation of transport, which led to an unchecked rise of taxi 
associations. 
McCaul (1990) also contends that the root of many conflicts in this industry 
appears to be as a result of defending routes. This author also states that the 
tightening of profit margins as a result of deregulation exacerbated this 
conflict. During peak hours, the effect of new entrants is not felt but during off-
peak hours when demand is low this largely affects the profitability of 
established operators. Allegations were also made about the inaction of police 
forces; they seldom did anything to stop the violence and it thus escalated. 
Some even believe that this was a deliberate government action to further 
fractionalise people in order to ensure that they did not unite to challenge the 
policies of that time. Khosa (1992) argues that feuds were generally between 
legal operators and illegal operators as well as between established operators 
and new entrants. After examining various case studies of taxi wars in 
Soweto, Katlehong and Alexandra, he concludes that the disputes were over 
rank space, poaching of passengers, undercutting of prices and the effects of 
rapid deregulation. 
Taxi violence has not only been a feature of the more affluent provinces like 
Gauteng and the Western Cape, this has been a feature in almost all areas of 
this country. A Commission on Inquiry in the King William's Town area (1994) 
in the Eastern Cape highlights this point. This report states that towards the 
7 Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga Taxi Association 
8 Western Cape Black Taxi Association 











end of the 1980s, the requirements for obtaining a permit were relaxed and 
this firmly established the minibus transport industry. The report finds that the 
general perception prevailing among the parties at war and other stakeholders 
is that the battle is for taxi routes and ranks. Because of fierce competition, 
taxi associations illegally deny others the right to ply certain lucrative routes 
and this causes much conflict. It is also stated that the problem is not only 
decreasing profits 10 and rising costs but also the inability of the free market 
system to operate in the industry. In other words market failure in the sector 
has occurred, which needs to be corrected to ensure the survival of this 
industry. The evidence put forward by this thesis suggests that responsible 
forms of regulation are perhaps the only means through which such forms of 
market failure can be addressed. Before examining the corrective measures, 
let us first consider the changing face of taxi violence in this country. 
10 This is as a result of an over subscribed market where the supply of taxi services far exceeds the 











3.2 THE ROOTS OF TAXI VIOLENCE II: 1994 - 2000 
What is interesting is that after the 1994 elections the level of violence 
increased within this industry. Dugard (2001) analyses the Cape Peninsula 
taxi wars over the period 1994-2000 and concludes that the problem of over-
traded routes persisted but other factors emerged like the dominance of 
mother bodies1\ conflict generated by government-initiated processes and 
official corruption. 
Just to put the notion of overtraded routes into perspective, let us consider 
Clark et al (1999) who examine the Cape Metropolitan Area. The writers state 
that in 1998, there were approximately 700 buses in operation, which serviced 
about 800 bus routes and covered 21 000 kilometres. In terms of the minibus 
taxi fleet, this totaled 6700, almost ten times the number of buses on the road. 
At the same time, the numerous taxis had only 300 routes to ply and the 
length of these routes was 6 400 kilometres. This implies one of two things: 
firstly that there are either too many taxis on the road thus overtrading is 
inevitable or second, there is some bias that limits taxis from engaging in 
some of the routes that the buses use. The obvious solution is to simply ply 
different routes if the ones in use are currently overtraded but as we will 
discover, the argument is not as simple as that because buses travel on 
unprofitable routes mainly because the government subsidises this service. 
Nonetheless the issues of over traded routes remains the key impediment to 
realizing profitability and ending violence. 
In terms of mother bodies, senior executive members had the power to decide 
who can use what route and which rank. These associations decided at what 
price this privilege would be and then operators were to pay their dues. 
Dugard (2001) contends that local associations provide invaluable services to 
operators, but mother bodies focus on appropriating money and organizing 
violence. This is done by employing hit men to 'eliminate' elements of 
II According to Dugard (2001), mother bodies typically comprise of loose alliances of local and long-












competing associations and other mother bodies. What has also been a 
cause of violence is the government's intentions to re-regulate the industry. A 
regulated industry will ensure an end to the operations of these mother bodies 
and that is obviously a change that they will not welcome. 
In terms of official corruption, a Temasek Polytechni (TP) news report (2000) 
states that corrupt police officers in Pretoria appeared to have joined forces 
with taxi gangsters. These police officers allegedly misdirected government 
property, which included firearms, bulletproof vests and police uniforms to taxi 
associations. This report contends that police were also believed to have 
participated in actual attacks against other taxi drivers and owners. This 
includes an attack that occurred on 15 July 1997 at a Soshanguve taxi rank in 
Pretoria. Furthermore the report states that police officials have also been 
implicated in witness tampering and supplying the identity of witnesses of taxi-
related crimes to taxi-crime bosses. Besides the incentive to extort from taxi 
operators, there is a growing number of police officials that secretly own taxi 
fleets (this is estimated at 10%) and clearly they are 'protecting' their interests. 
The report also states that the turf wars over the taxi routes between the 
SOTOA12 and SOLLDTA13 have resulted in an estimated 1500 - 3000 deaths 
since 1994. 
From March 2000, the Western Cape area was also subject to much violence. 
This occurred when certain members of the taxi industry started issuing 
threats to the Golden Arrow Bus Company and its drivers, stating that it had to 
stop operating within the Khayelitsha Township. This company initially 
continued its activities but taxi operators soon started gunning down those 
that defied this order. The shootings were initially directed at bus drivers but 
soon commuters were also targeted as they were seen to be choosing buses 
instead of taxis. At the time, taxi stakeholders believed and still generally 
believe that they face unfair competition, since the bus industry is subsidised 
by the government and the taxi industry is not. According to Jefthas (2002), 
many people felt that the taxi industry was being marginalized, that it was not 
12 Soshanguve Taxi Owners Association 











recognized as a legitimate part of the transport sector and for many, the bus 
industry was a symbol of the apartheid government. Many drivers blamed this 
system for the fact that they sometimes could not meet their targets. 
According to Clark et al (1999), a key factor determining public transport 
market share is subsidization and the resulting fare structures. These authors 
state that the 1998/99 annual subsidy for rail transportation was R 255 million, 
which is equivalent to a subsidy of R2 per passenger trip of about 12 
kilometres. When looking at Golden Arrow Bus Services (Western Cape), the 
national department of Transport subsidised this service by R160 million, 
which translates to a subsidy of R5,52 per passenger trip of about 15 
kilometres. The authors continue to state that these subsidies have been 
growing phenomenally in the last few years and that they have a fundamental 
impact on passenger fare systems. Bus and rail services can afford to offer 
discount tickets for monthly tickets, pensioners etc but because of subsidies, 
minibus taxi fares are the most expensive for any given route/distance. The 
authors also state that third class rail is the most affordable way to travel and 
clearly this subsidy system disadvantages those working within the minibus 
taxi industry14. This is clearly one ofthe major reasons that over trading does 
occur, taxis cannot afford to ply unprofitable routes whereas the bus services 
can as a result of the subsidies they receive. 
In fact it makes sense not to merely view the taxi industry in isolation but to 
briefly consider the entire public transport sector and this is done in the next 
chapter. 











4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPORT SECTOR 
Before we further evaluate the numerous problems that thwart the transport 
sector, it is important to establish the contribution that it makes to the country. 
Barrett (2001) embarks on an enlightening account of the economic 
significance of the transport sector in South Africa. The writer states that that 
in 1999, this sector contributed 10% to South Africa's Gross Domestic 
Product. This calculation excludes amongst others the minibus taxi industry 
and if this figure was recalculated, it could reach a high of 13%. The transport 
sector also accounted for 16% of all new investment (R18,6bn) in 1999. In 
addition, one has to consider the industry's annual expenditure on goods like 
fuel, tyres, servicing, repairs and many other associated activities. What is 
also important is that transport costs have a direct effect on the price of 
commodities and these costs can range from 1-7%. In addition, Barrett (2001) 
also highlights that this sector is on aggregate not profitable. The bus sector is 
currently making losses, freight companies are making modest profits and it 
seems that only the air transport sector is making any significant profits. 
In terms of the urban passenger transport system, Barrett (2001) states that 
South Africans spend a higher proportion of their incomes on transport than is 
the case in other countries. Between the period November 1999 to November 
2000, passenger transport costs rose by 12,4% while in the same period the 
CPI only rose by 7.1 %. This shows that this sector has experienced price 
increases that exceeded the rate of inflation. Perhaps the need for imported 
crude oil to supply the fuel requirements in the context of a depreciating 
currency can be attributed as the principal reason for this more rapid inflation 
rate. 
In terms of the bus service sector, 25% of commuters make use of this 
service and in 1996 buses carried over 460 million passengers. The bus 
sector is experiencing numerous problems with the new competitive based 
tendering system. Among the problems experienced are that it reduces 











consequently poor service delivery15. The move towards this tendering system 
was a result of the failure of the subsidy approach. May (1998) states that in 
1995/96, the Department of Transport paid out R901 million in subsidies for 
bus transportation. This staggering amount formed about 50% of the 
operating income of subsidised bus companies. There were no incentives or 
penalties in place to ensure that efficiency was promoted. Another major 
problem with this system, is that the operators that benefit are those that do 
not carry the majority of the poor, i.e. the beneficiaries of these subsidies are 
not the very poor but rather form a segment of the middle-income earners. 
May (1998) argues that the minibus taxi industry carries the majority of the 
poor and so subsidies earmarked for the bus sector do not benefit the very 
poor. 
Moving on to the rail services, Clark et al (1999) state that during the 1995/96 
financial year, fare revenues in the Cape Metropolitan Area only accounted for 
44% of the full operating costs, the rest was funded by a deficit subsidy 
system. This subsidy is essentially the difference between total costs and 
passenger revenue. This was not a phenomenon particular to the Western 
Cape only as the authors state that in Johannesburg and Durban, fare 
revenues covered 31 % of the full operating costs. The need to undertake 
such deficit forms of financing in the rail services sector is perhaps a reflection 
of a wider set of issues: these include problems apparent within the rail 
services such as theft, vandalism and accidents, which are rife. Barrett (2001) 
states that 17% of all commuters use this system and in 1996, there were 
4519 coaches in operation, which carried 470 million passengers. The 
employment figures have also been on the decline. Barrett (2001) states that 
the formal employment statistics for the transport industry (this excludes 
minibus taxis) stood at 383 143 people in 1981 and in 2000 this figure was 
221 552. This shows that there has been a considerable decline over a period 
of two decades, as in 1981, this sector supported 7.8% of the formally 
employed while in 2000, this had declined to 4,7%. 











According to the African Business Magazine (2001), the minibus taxi industry 
carries 65% of South Africa's daily commuters and it is estimated that there 
are 130000 minibus taxis in operation. Furthermore, there are approximately 
80 000 employed workers in this sector and as a whole, the taxi industry 
earns upwards of R9bn a year in revenue. Having highlighted the contribution 
of this industry, it is time to move on to the working conditions that prevail in 











4.1 WORKING CONDITIONS WITHIN THE MINIBUS TAXI 
INDSUTRY 
The working conditions in this industry are extremely harsh and Khosa (1998) 
establishes that the majority of drivers enter this industry out of desperation 
from lack of employment. This form of employment is undesirable because 
drivers have to endure very long working hours (from 16-20 hours a day) and 
operate in an environment where their safety can be in jeopardy as a result of 
hi-jackings and taxi violence. Moreover drivers are always under pressure to 
meet targets set by owners and they are not well remunerated for their efforts. 
According to Jurgensen (1998), it is common for a driver to wake up at 
3:30am every morning to go to work and return after 9pm. For this he earns 
R1000 a month. Jefthas (2002) states that on average drivers may bring in 
R 1600 - R2000 per week and the drivers would then be given R200 - R250 
as their weekly wage16• Drivers are given set targets to meet and their wage is 
directly related to whether or not they reach these targets. That is the reason 
for the reckless driving, overcrowded taxis and impatience that taxi drivers 
exhibit - they are under pressure to meet targets that can be unreasonable. 
Drivers have also been unaware that they are entitled to certain key rights. 
But even when they are aware of the existence of these rights, which can be 
used as protection, they have been powerless to assert them. Matiko (1989) 
states that by law taxi drivers are employees and have rights to certain 
entitlements. They are entitled to a basic wage, Unemployment Insurance 
Fund, leave and Workmen's Compensation Fund benefits. Drivers do not get 
any of these benefits and in fact there is no job security for them. An inquiry 
was lodged to the Golden Arrow Bus Company in Cape Town to ascertain 
what benefits bus drivers received. Bus drivers currently receive pension, 
medical aid, an annual bonus, sick leave, paid leave, free uniforms, free bus 
pass to travel on Golden Arrow buses at any time as well as a long service 
bonus, which one receives after working for 20 years at Golden Arrow. The 
starting wage is R804 per week and the highest wage paid to any driver is 
R 1111 per week. What bus drivers earn on a weekly basis is in fact what taxi 











drivers earn when working for a month. Over and above this, bus drivers 
enjoy numerous benefits, which are in line with the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
Considering that taxi drivers feel that their employers exploit them, let us 
review the perspective of employers. According to Jefthas (2002), employers 
say that they have maintenance expenses to pay for and also there is a 
feeling that they are doing the driver a favour. The latter is based on the fact 
that there is much unemployment in South Africa so those drivers that are 
employed at all should feel grateful. The relationship between employer and 
employee is a difficult one and Jefthas (2002) states that this relationship has 
an unequal balance of power and consequently exploitation, fear and 
intimidation are rife. This author continues to state that contracts between 
these two parties are oral in nature and can be terminated at the owner's 
discretion. Khosa (1994) establishes from an interview with a taxi driver that 
they are hired as casuals and are dismissed when ill or involved in accidents. 
Furthermore, if drivers brought in less than the set target, it was not 
uncommon for them to incur the wrath of the employer and face the prospect 
of losing their jobs. Khosa (1994) identifies further exploitation in the form of a 
'postponed-wage' system. In this case, the owner pays the driver 20% of their 
salary and then claims that the rest will be paid at the end of the month. Many 
drivers never receive the remainder of this money at the end of the month as 
the employer claims that the driver has 'failed' the probation period. This 
sentiment is also captured by Moss (1993) who after numerous interviews 
with taxi drivers concludes that the biggest problem as seen by taxi drivers is 
'greedy/unreasonable owners'. 
In order to gain an in depth understanding of the workings of this sector the 
Survey of Wages and Employment Conditions in the Taxi Industry was 
analysed. The Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) designed and 
administered two sets of questionnaires 17 directed at taxi employers and 
employees. The survey involved administering two separate questionnaires: a 










questionnaire that was directed to drivers and a questionnaire that was 
designed to obtain information from taxi owners. Logistics did not allow a 
linkage to be made between the employer and the driver questionnaires but 
this separation was convenient at protecting the confidentiality of each and 
avoiding any repercussions against informants about the type of information 
that was divulged to outside investigators. Therefore each questionnaire was 
administered for different samples in each province. The focus of this section 
will be on the employee survey in order to ascertain the working conditions in 
this industry as well as to establish the dynamics of the wage system. 
Table 1: The Demographic Profile 
i Urban Gauteng 
I Number of respondents i ~ AREA 
I 75 
I Urban KwaZulu Natal 75 
i 
I Urban Limpopo 75 
I Peri-Urban Gauteng 73 
. Rural KwaZulu Natal 72 
[ Rural Limpopo 75 ~IT_O_T_A_L ________ ~ ______ 4_45 ____ ~ 
The sample is thus evenly split amongst three provinces and it is also 
subdivided between those working in rural and those in urban areas. The 
majority of the sample consists of males, as only 8 of the respondents are 
female. This type of gender profile generally reflects the overall transport 
industry but it also suggests that the mini-bus taxi industry is a particularly 
harsh industry to work within. For the purposes of this paper, the analysis will 
not focus on the effects of gender on other covariates. 
The first issue that will be examined is the monthly income that drivers receive 











Table 2: Monthly Income before any Taxes or Deductions 
MONTHL Y INCOME i OBS ! MEAN I MEDIAN 
I Urban Gauteng : 66 I 1351 I 1200 
Urban KwaZulu Natal I 71 L 1375 I 1400 -----1 
I i I Urban Limpo~ 70 1161 1200 i 
Peri-Urban Gauteng i 70 I 1293 I 1200 I I-=- . .. 
I i Rural KwaZulu Natal 68 958 1000 I 
R I L· 71 1076 I 900 ~ura Impopo 
IOVERALL _________ ~ ___ 4~1._6 __ ~ ____ ~1~20~2 .. ~_-~_-_~.~I~_-_--_-1-2-0.~O~~==: 
It is clear that not all the employees answered this question thus our sample 
has been reduced to 416 individuals. What we see is that those working in 
urban KwaZulu Natal (KZN) receive the highest monthly income but in the 
rural areas of KZN they receive considerably less. This means that earnings 
are differentiated geographically. The earnings for the workers throughout the 
sector can be characterised as exhibiting a geographic effect as workers can 
expect to earn different levels of income depending on the areas they work in. 
In terms of the overall sample, we see that both the mean and median 
earnings are R1200. An important issue that the survey investigates is the 
number of people living in each of the driver'S households and on average, 6 
people (including the respondent) live in these households. The survey further 
establishes that on average the drivers are financially responsible for at least 
4 members of their households, which shows that the income that is derived 
from this industry plays a significant role in sustaining not just the drivers but 
entire households. In fact in terms of the total monthly household income 
before taxes and deductions, the mean value of household income is R2359 
but the median is much lower at R1400. This illustrates the dependence of 
such households on income derived from the taxi industry but it also 
demonstrates the vulnerability of the household to this latter source being 
terminated, as the median income for the respondents is R1200 per month. 
As with all forms of employment, education is considered a key factor for 
determining one's earning potential. We will establish the correlation between 
education levels and the incomes earned but firstly let us examine the 











Figure 1: Emplovees: Education Level Passed 
Percent 
30"k ,-----------------., 
25% +-------- - - - ----__ - -:1 
20% +------ - --------
15% -/--- - -----------1.._-
10% -
5% +- --- ---
~ +-~~-,~~~~ 
This graph informs us that in fact the employees within the taxi industry have 
acquired some level of formal education. There is a high concentration of 
respondents within the grade 7 to grade 12 grouping. This illustrates the 
nature of the labour market in this country, as individuals who have at least 
some form of secondary education are not normally absorbed within the 
formal sector. The high unemployment rate and skills bias that is prevalent in 
this country leads even those who have completed grade 12 to seek 
employment within the informal sector. Human capital theory asserts that 
those with higher levels of education reap higher earnings. Using the available 
survey data, I proceed to test this hypothesis for the South African taxi 
industry. 
Table 3: Education and Income 
MONTHLY I, 
INCOME Observations Frequency Mean Median 
No formal 
education 8 1.92% 913 800 
Lower Primary 22 5.28% 1068 1200 
Upper Qrimary 55 13.22% 1163 1200 
Lower 
Secondary 152 36.5% 1197 1200 
Upper 
Secondary 164 39.42% 1237 1200 
Di~oma/Degree 7 1.68% 1414 1200 
Refused 8 1.92% 1315 1160 















Once again we see that 75% of the respondents have some form of 
secondary education but what is interesting is that this has little effect on 
monthly income. In terms of the median, only those with no formal education 
earn less than the rest of the sample as for every other education level, the 
median is set at R1200. This leads one to conclude that in fact the human 
capital theory does not hold in this industry: higher levels of education do not 
generally translate to higher levels of income. This will be tested further 
utilizing regression analysis. 
The age of drivers in the sample ranges from 20 years up until the age of 64 
years. (The mean age for the sample is 34 years) It is assumed that with age, 
one gains experience and the labour market rewards this. This is one of the 
postulates of the human capital theory. Let us examine whether this is the 
case within the minibus taxi industry. 
Table 4: Age and Income 
AGE CODE I Frequenc~ 
I 
Mean Median I 
20 < 28 91 1232 1200 
28 < 32 74 1185 1200 
32 < 35 71 1162 1200 
35 < 40 I 84 1269 1200 
40 <=64 I 91 1162 1200 
TOTAL I 411 i 
Firstly, the median suggests that in fact, age makes no difference to the 
earning power of taxi drivers but the mean offers some contrasting results. 
Those aged 35 to less than 40 seem to enjoy a premium far above the rest of 
the employees. But those aged below 28 also seem to earn more than the 
other cohorts as well. One cannot make any judgments based on the 
directions of these values but what is clear is that two variables, education 
and age, which are considered key in boosting earnings have been rendered 
ineffective. 
If age is not a factor, perhaps then the number of years working within the taxi 
















Table 5: Experience and Income 
[NUMBER OF YEARS I Frequency Mean Median 
0<3 I 95 1202 1200 -
3<6 121 1224 1200 
I 
6<9 81 1184 1200 I I I i 
I 9 < 12 59 1201 1~00 
I




Once again we see that the median shows that the years spent working in the 
industry do not determine one's income as the value remains at R1200 for the 
different cohorts. What is interesting though is that the mean income for all the 
groups yields unclear results as at some points we see increasing returns to 
experience while in others we see decreasing returns. But considering that 
the income differential covers such a small range (of up to R41), we cannot 
make any valid conclusions. So at best it seems that the experience variable 
yields ambiguous results or no results at all. 
Perhaps the number of years in the industry is not a good proxy for 
experience so let us consider the length of time that one has had a car 
driver's license. When this variable was compared to monthly income, it did 
not yield significant results. Another question ascertained whether the 
respondents had a PDP (public drivers permit), which allows one the 
permission to carry passengers in a vehicle18. The result of the comparison is 
shown in Table 6 below: 
Table 6: Number of Years with PDP License and Income 
I NUMBER OF YEARS . Frequency i Mean 
I 
i Median 
I 0<3 92 I 1231 1200 
I 3<6 102 1173 1200 
I 6 < 10 89 1247 1200 
I 10 < 15 71 1197 1200 
I 15 <= 30 34 I 1221 
ITOTAL_~ 
1200--.J 
,-~38_8 __ .L-1 _______ .~. ___ _____J 
18 A public driver's license is different from an ordinary driver's license as it empowers the incumbent 
to transport passengers in a vehicle designated for this purpose. (In this instance, a mini bus taxi 











Firstly, 93% of the sample stated that they had a PDP license but the results 
here also do not offer any conclusive information. If anything, judging by the 
median, the length of years that drivers held this type of license has no effect 
on earnings. Perhaps then experience is not a factor but let us continue and 
examine the type of work done and ascertain if this determines driver 
earnings. 
The survey then proceeded to enquire about the specifics of the work that the 
drivers perform. What is established is that most drivers are either engaged in 
short or long distance work: 45% of the sample stated that they drove short 
distance trips while 29% of the respondents stated that they drove long 
distances. The remaining 25% of the sample drives a mixture of short to 
medium to long distance trips. This distribution is as a result of the sample 
design but what is interesting, is the mean income earned for each type of 
trip. For those engaged in short distance trips this is R1254 while for those 
involved in long distance travel, the mean income is not significantly different 
at R1261. (For both the median is R1200) This implies that irrespective of the 
type of trip taken, the income earned is similar. But on closer analysis, the 
distance covered seems to have an impact of the income earned. This makes 
sense as if short distance drivers drive backwards and forwards on their set 
routes more often; they can pick up more commuters and thus make more 
money. Similarly for long distance drivers, if they for instance drive from 
Gauteng to Durban and back in one day, they will make more money than if 
they only do a single non-return trip. 
Table 7: Daily Distance Traveled and Income 
I DISTANCE 
1M d' iCOVERED Frequency Mean i elan 





150 < 300km I 65 1160 I 1200 
-------: 
I 300 < 400km 
400 < 500km 
i 500 < 1000km 
~. 









1165 1200 I 
1278 1200 i 













Table 7 shows that for those traveling less than 400km a day, they get paid 
significantly less than those that cover more distance. But the most interesting 
result is for those that cover upwards of 500km per day; they are the ones that 
earn the most. But a distance of over 500km per day is typical of a long 
distance driver, not a short distance driver. This might mean that only long 
distance drivers earn these larger incomes but earlier we established that the 
mean income of the two is very similar. So the next step is to establish the 
mean distance traveled by either type of driver. 
Table 8: Distance Traveled by Type of Driver 
I Percentile Short Distance (155 obs) . Long distance (109 obs) 
f------1-%-o----+--·· .. 7 I 45 I 
5% 30· 60 . 
10% 50 I -2-00------' 
I 25% 90 350 
I 50% (median) 210 420 
I 
~ 75% 350 700 90% 600 1300 
I 95% 616 I 1600 
~an 99% 800 I 2000 254 I 619 
Table 7 has shown that the median income for those traveling less than 
500km per day is R1200 and Table 8 now shows that for both types of drivers 
the median distance traveled is also less than 500km per day. This reaffirms 
the accuracy of the median income calculation. What seems unclear is the 
mean income. Previously it was established that for short distance drivers the 
mean income is R1254 (188 observations) and for long distance drivers this 
was R1261 (124 observations). But Table 8 shows clearly that there is a 
significant difference in the mean distance traveled, thus implying that there 
should be a significant difference in the mean income earned: 254km for short 
distance drivers as opposed to 619km for long distance drivers. A plausible 
explanation may be that Table 8 has captured fewer observations (155 for 
short distance drivers and 109 for long distance drivers) and this may be 
skewing the results, as with 619km traveled by long distance drivers, one 















Nonetheless, the above table yields very interesting results: we see that for 
short distance drivers, on average they travel over 200km per day and this 
would translate to earnings of between R1160 and R1200 (earnings taken 
from Table 7) but if we focus on the top ten percent of the distribution, they 
travel 600 - 800km a day, thus pushing up their income to R1350 (reference 
to Table 7). The same analysis can be used for long distance drivers to prove 
that indeed distance is a key indicator in determining earnings. This goes to 
explain why taxis drive so recklessly and they overload their taxis: more 
passengers over farther distances translate to significantly higher earnings. 
Considering that we have thus far established two key variables, namely 
distance covered and area of employment as the driving factors of 
employment, let us examine the interaction between these two. 
Table 9: Distance and Area of Employment 
i DAIL Y DISTANCE lOBS LMEAN MEDIAN 
I Urban Gauteng I 42 ! 694 440 
Urban KwaZulu Natal I 75 I 482 350 
Urban lIm~o~o i 65 330 340 
Peri-Urban Gauteng 
I 
53 281 300 
I Rural KwaZulu Natal 61 184 90 
I Rural Limpo~o I 45 304 260 
I 341 
.. =-1 TOTAL 
~.-.. 
Firstly, 416 individuals stated what they earned but here we see that there are 
only 341 responses and specifically in urban Gauteng and rural Limpopo, we 
have lost a number of observations. This can be expected to skew the results 
to some extent. Nevertheless, it was previously established that those working 
in urban KZN earned the highest incomes and those in urban Gauteng earned 
similar incomes as well. The above table makes it clear why because in these 
two areas, drivers cover more distance. The drivers in rural KZN cover the 
least distances (the median distance traveled is 90km per day while the mean 
distance covered is 184 km per day) and for this reason, their incomes are 
lower. This may simply be indicative of the rural areas where there is no 











places and thus the demand for this service is significantly less than it is in 
urban areas. 
Considering that driving longer distances translates to higher incomes, it 
makes sense to assess the effects of income on the number of days worked 
per week. 
Table 10: Days Worked per week and Income 
I DAYS WORKED i Frequency I Mean i Median .====1 
~----1~·----~--~-7:~----r.----~11~~2~1-----r-· 1200 
1-----2 -7----
rl ----:-1 ~15=7::c-·--r-----1-000 ---i 
I I 
I 
! 3 9 1211 1200 1 
I 4 7 1371 I 1200 I 
I 5 6 1233 1300 I 
I 6 I 86 1222 1200 i C-7 294 1194 1200 
'TOTAL 416 
Table 10 highlights a very important fact, namely that 70% of taxi drivers work 
seven days a week. One of the questions in the survey enquires whether 
employees get any additional pay for working on Saturdays and Sundays and 
97% of the respondents stated that they got paid the same as on weekdays. 
Also, 74% of the sample stated that they worked on public holidays and once 
again did not receive any additional pay for this. This means that for taxi 
drivers a normal work week is seven days long and public holidays are 
generally treated as workdays as well. This explains why we do not see any 
income differentials above as there is no such thing as overtime pay. In fact, 
this concept is not defined in this industry. What is also very interesting is that 
the response to the survey questions on whether drivers ever work overtime 
indicated that 68% of the sample stated that they did not. Furthermore, those 
that said that they did work overtime earned a mean income of R1129 (133 
observations) and for those that claim that they never work overtime, a mean 
income of R1236 (283 observations) is earned. This re-emphasises the notion 
that overtime is not acknowledged or defined in this industry therefore drivers 













Another variable that yielded important results is that of the number of hours 
worked per day. 
Table 11: Hours Worked per day and Income 
I HOURS ! • 
i Frequency_~an . i WORKED Median 
! 0< 5hrs 29 1043 1000 I 
I 5 < 10 hrs I 25 1012 1000 
10 <12 hrs 76 1122 1200 
12 <13hrs 79 1232 1200---1 
13 < 15hrs I 120 l 1231 1200 
I 15 <= 19hrs I 87 ! 1313 1200 ~ 
TOTAL i 416 I _. 
.--~.--. 
Firstly, we see that only 13% of the sample works less than 10 hours per day 
and the income of this cohort is significantly less than the rest of the sample. 
At least 50% of the sample works over 13 hours a day and their income is not 
significantly different from those drivers that work more than 10 but less than 
13 hours a day. In other words whether one works 12, 13, 14 or 15 hours a 
day, does not affect the level of monthly income they earn. This really 
hjghlights the nature of this industry as drivers work extremely long hours, 
seven days a week and are under immense pressure to cover the most 
distance possible in order to secure higher earnings. But what separates this 
industry from other industries is that although the overall hours are long, taxi 
drivers spend a proportion of their time waiting for the taxis to fill up. This idle 
time constitutes a large portion of the daily workday. The table below 
illustrates the extent of this idle time. 
Table 12: Idle Time and Income 
I IDLE TIME I Frequency Mean Median r=o < 2 hours I 127 1177 1200 
• 2 < 4 hours I 139 1197 1200 
I 4 < 6 hours I 88 1254 1200 
I 6 <= 12 hours i 62 1193 1200 
• TOTAL I 416 I C-.--. .. _ .. 
This table shows that a large proportion of time at work is spent waiting for 
fares at the taxi rank. In fact on average, taxi drivers spend 3 hours of their 











can inconvenience passengers as well. Firstly, taxis queue at the taxi ranks 
and so drivers have to wait for other drivers in front of them to fill up their taxis 
before it is their turn. When the taxi reaches the front of the line, they either fill 
up the taxi or fill it up to a set minimum number of passengers that is 
considered cost effective. The concept of setting some minimum number of 
passengers before traveling is prevalent with short distance drivers but with 
long distance drivers, the taxi has to be filled if losses are to be contained. For 
passengers, waiting for the taxi to fill up can be extremely frustrating and can 
lead to some passengers seeking other modes of transportation should they 
be available as trains and buses leave at specific set times irrespective of how 
many passengers are on board. The reason that taxis cannot do this is 
because unlike their direct competitors they are not subsidised. Excessive idle 
time is caused by over trading. In the mornings (during peak hours), taxis 
queue up at the ranks but leave very quickly as there are many commuters. 
During off peak hours, taxis queue again and since a few individuals need 
transportation during this period, the waiting continues. If there are fewer 
taxis, idle time is reduced considerably. 
In terms of whether idle time determines income, we see that there is very 
little difference in earnings if one waits anything from less than two hours up 
to twelve hours. This is not the only problem that drivers experience but for 
long distance drivers there are more issues. Earlier it was established that 
about 30% of the sample engaged solely on long distance trips. Considering 
that these trips are time consuming, the survey enquires about where these 
drivers sleep during these trips. The table below elaborates on this. 
Table 13: Accommodation 
Where do you sleep if you travel over night? i Frequency Percent 
~~eQ in taxi (other driver driving} i 31 24% 
: SleeQ in taxi (park taxi somewhere) i 67 52% i 
I Rent accommodation for the night 14 I 11% 
rsta~ with friends or famil~. . 10 I 8% 
I Never have to sleep away'" from home I 7 I 5% i i 











More than half of the respondents stated that they parked the taxi somewhere 
and slept in it. Unfortunately the survey does not question for how long the 
drivers sleep but the fact that drivers and passengers are left exposed for 
some period of time overnight highlights the vulnerability that is endured. Had 
there been a second driver present at all times, this would be avoided but it 
seems the present organisation of the industry does not make provision for 
this arrangement. Only a quarter of these respondents stated that when they 
travel overnight, a second driver accompanies them. It is also surprising that 
only 11 % stated that they rented accommodation for the night. But one 
wonders if the driver does not sleep in the taxi but elsewhere (be it with family 
or by securing rented accommodation), then what actually happens to the 
passengers? Perhaps they are left sleeping in the taxi. This really emphasizes 
the plight that both drivers and passengers have to endure, although similar 
features may characterise the long distance transport industry as well. 
The survey also enquires about who bears the expenses of the trip and the 
results are shown in table 14: 
Table 14: Who pays the Expenses? 
:r-A-=-C=-C=-O=M:-::O:-::O=-A:-::T=I-::::O=-N::----------------;-1 -F r-e-quenc-LY_'-' P_._e_r_c_e_n_t. __ _ 
I Employer-,p_a~y_s ______________ ---i ____ 8 ___ --4-!_ 7% 
I Driver pays . 28 23% 
I No costs involved l 84 1 70% 
~_T_O_T_A_L ___________________ ~ __ 1_20~ __ ~I ___ 1_00_o/~ 
!FOOD ! 
Employer pays I 46 d 36% 
Driver pays 80 62% 
.. _-_. 
No costs involved I don't eat food 3 2% 




35 27% Employer pays 
I Employer does not p~ 94 73% 
iTOTAL 129 100% 
In terms of accommodation, 70% of the respondents stated that there were no 
costs involved and this probably refers to those that sleep in the taxi or are 













stated that the owner of the taxi paid but the remaining 23% stated that they 
bore the costs for accommodation. When asked about who pays the food, 
62% stated that they did while 36% stated that the employer did so. Finally 
when asked about who paid for any other expenses, the response was mainly 
that the employer did not pay for any other expenses. For the sake of clarity it 
was asked what these additional costs that the employer covered were and 
the responses ranged from tollgate fees, to maintenance fees and to petrol 
costs. This implies that when the employer does not pay, all these costs are 
borne by the driver. 
It seems that these are not the only costs that the drivers pay because some 
drivers travel with fare collectors. Fare collectors playa vital role as they allow 
the driver peace of mind as they handle all the cash transactions so that the 
driver is able to focus on his duty as a driver. Although fare collectors play an 
important role, only 32% (142 observations) of the respondents stated that 
they normally traveled with one. The obvious reason for this is because fare 
collectors too must get paid. It is established that the average daily rate of a 
fare collector is R30 but the real question is who bears this cost. 
Table 15: Monthly Income of Taxi Driver when Fare Collectors are 
present 
I Who pays fare collector? I Observations I Mean I Median I 
I The driver pays . l 50 1183 1200 I 
I The owner pays 
! 
37 1334 1400 I 
IOther--· 
! 
42 1177 116J !TOTAL . __ ..~. 129 I 
The above table shows that in the instance that a fare collector is present, it is 
mainly the driver or another source that is required to bear the costs. This 
other source is mainly the local taxi association. What is interesting is that 
when the owner does pay the fare collector, the driver's monthly income is 
higher as the driver has not had to pay from his own earnings. This is a very 
interesting observation but one has to consider that there may be some flaw 
in terms of the driver responses. Consider that a fare collector is paid R30 a 











month. If on average, drivers earn R1200 then it is virtually impossible that 
they can afford to keep a collector on their payroll. But irrespective of this the 
point that is to be noted is that fare collectors playa vital role in the industry 
but are not always present in taxis and this is probably as a result of 
attempting to contain costs although safety is jeopardized. 
In terms of other operating costs, the questionnaire establishes that 52% of 
the respondents cover petrol costs, 76% stated that they also covered the 
cost of cleaning the vehicle and 87% stated that they paid for traffic fines. The 
owners generally paid for maintenance costs, vehicle insurance, the license of 
the taxi and they also paid for fines relating to the vehicle being unroadworthy. 
If an accident does occur, costs are largely shared between employer and 
employee as well as any other third party. 
One of the most interesting questions in the survey relates to deductions that 
the employer takes from the earnings of the driver. In all our previous 
analysis, we have focused on monthly income before taxes and deductions 
were made. The question asks whether the driver is a member of any medical 
aid scheme, pension/provident fund or life insurance scheme. At least 99% of 
the respondents stated that they were not. Only 21 % stated that they were 
members of a burial fund and on average, the amount deducted for this is 
R70 per month. Other than that, there are no deductions taken from the 
employee's earnings: neither for any accident insurance fund nor for the 
unemployment insurance fund. This is an indication of lack of safety nets for 
employees in this industry. Drivers work long hours, travel long distances yet 
have no provisions for the effects of accidents, unemployment or death. The 
fact that they have no safety nets does not just affect them as individuals but 
also their households as they could easily be plunged into poverty as well. 
There is more to be said about the imbalanced relationship between driver 
and owner as owners have the overall say in all the elements of the 
employment relationship. Considering that 90% of the respondents do not 
have a contract with their employers, they cannot enforce any clauses and 











have contracts, they were mainly verbal in nature and 6 respondents stated 
having written contracts but they generally did not have copies of these. In 
terms of revisions to wages and working conditions, this is done irregularly 
and the owner decides if and when he wants to do this. Almost all of the 
respondents (95%) stated not receiving any pay slips and this causes 
problems in terms of opening bank accounts or applying for loans. 
Furthermore, 97% of the respondents stated that they did not receive any paid 
leave during the year and very few were allowed to take unpaid leave. In fact 
62% stated that they could not take sick leave. If drivers take leave and the 
employer is unhappy about this, he can simply fire the driver or just not pay 
him. Maternity and paternity leave is an unknown concept in this industry. 
There is room to address these issues and improve the conditions associated 
with each but this might only take place through some sort of trade union or 
employee organization. The data showed that 92% of the respondents stated 
that they were not members of any such unions. What is clear is that drivers 
are not aware of the benefits that this may have and it seems that they are not 
aware of the benefits that they should be getting as employed citizens in this 
country. It is this lack of awareness and high unemployment that leads drivers 
to accept their harsh working conditions. One would think that drivers feel 
exploited by their owners but surprisingly one of the final questions in the 
survey examines how the respondent would rate his relationship with his 
employer and the replies ranged from average to very good. Very few felt that 
they had a very bad relationship with their employers. This is in direct contrast 
to Moss' (1993) findings where drivers stated that their employers' greed was 
the major problem. 
Having examined the prevailing working conditions, it is fitting to further 
examine the key relationships within our variables and regression analysis will 











4.2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS TO ESTABLISH THE 
DETERMINANTS OF MONTHLY INCOME 
Regress: logmonthinc 
Variables: years of education, years of experience, age, area, distance, hours 
worked, days worked, problems with leave and idle time. 
Number of Observations: 317 
F(28, 288) = 3.81 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.2702 
Adj R-squared = 0.1992 
Root MSE = 0.36844 
iMOdeI--TI4.4750679 28 . 0.516966712 
lSOurce·- I SS df I MS i 
Residual 139.0961397 28£f1 (f135750485 
fOtaf- I 53.5712077 316 i~.169529138 I 
I Logmonthinc I CoeT- Std Err It 
~. 
i P>ltl 195% Conf. In~~ 
: Years of Education .01778 0.00926 1.92 ! 0.056 . -0.00--o!O.036 
: Experience -0.0050 0.00498 I -0.1 : 0.919 -0.010 0.009. 
! Age 1-0.0000 0.00332 . -0.00 0.996 -0.007 0.007. 
I Urban KZN 10.06270 0.08339 0.71 i 0.479 -0.111 0.237 
I Urban Limpo~o -0.1780 0.09019 -1.97 0.049 -0.356 -0.001 
I Peri-urban Gauteng -0.2989 0.09384 -0.32 0.75 -0.215 r-~ 6155 
LRural Limpopo -0.2057 0.09645 -2.13 I 0.034 -0.396 -0.016 c----. .::-T .. -.~--'--.-.~.-.-.-- -.~-.~-.-
! Rural KZN i -0.35-17 0.09579 -3.67 I 0.000 -0.540 -0.163 
~~~ : ~gg~~-.-·-r~~o~~~~ 0.07177 -0.29 0.774 -0.162 0.121 0.07818 1.09 0.276 -0.069 0.239 
1400 < 500km 0.14665 0.07824 1.87 0.062 • -0.007 0.301 
I 500 < 1000km 0.19615 0.07566 2.59 0.01 0.047 0.345 i 
[1000 < 5000km 0.20835 0.11574 1.8 0.073 -0.019 0.4361 
15 < 10 hrs worked -0.1538 0.11540 1 -1.3310.184 -0.381 0.073 I 
.---.-.-~. 
-0.124 I 10 <12 hrs worked 0.07467 0.10079 I 0.74 0.459 0.273 
112 <13hrs worked 0.15535 0.101471 1.53 0.127 -0.044 I 0.355 
:1 13 < 15hrs worked 0.1416 0.09693 1.46 0.145 -0.049 0.332 
w.5 <= 19hrs worked 0.08304 I 0.10034 0.83 0.409 -0.114 0.281 
I 2 days worked -0.1112 ~ 0.20502 -0.54 0.588 -0.515 0.292 
~~cJ.§1}'s!".9~Ke~~~~~~ -0.0366 i 0.21169 -0.17 0.863 1 -0.453 0.380 
i 4 days worked 0.15083 i 0.21835 0.69 '-0.49 I -0.279 0.581 
I 5 days worked I 0.04508 i 0.22657 0.2 0.842 -0.401 0.491 
: 6 days worked. . 10.08441: 0.16713 0.51 I 0.614 I -0.245 I 0.413 
I 7 days worked~~-~ I -0.0495~~ cf 15730 ----0.32 i 0.753 I ~0.359l... 0.260 
I Problems with leave 1 0.14056 : 0.04953 2.84 : 0.005 I 0.043 I 0.238 J 
12 <4 hrs~~_ I 0.01834 i 0.0??~~~_0.32 I 0.752 i __ :-O~.Q~§l--O~gj 
14< 6 hrs idle l 0.03626 : 0.06617 0.55 I 0:58?J_-0.094~l--0..:1~ 
I 6<=12 hrs idle • -0.0091 I 0.0755~_,-::.0.12 IQ.9Q.£L -0.158 I 0.140 I 
.~--.-.-.-.-.-. 











The above regression table examines the relationship between log monthly 
income and a number of key variables that mayor may not playa role in 
determining the monthly income earned by drivers. In interpreting the results, 
Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) highlight that when the dependent variable is 
in logarithmic form, it is imperative that the antilog of the coefficient be taken. 
Thereafter, 1 must be subtracted in order to attain the most accurate rate of 
return for that variable. The first variable that is regressed is that of years of 
education and the co-efficient is 0.01778. Taking the antilog and subtracting 1 
yields 1,79%. This shows that at a 5% significance level, every unit increase 
in education changes the predicted monthly income (that being the actual 
monthly income, not the log transformed variable 'Iogmonthinc', since the anti 
log has been taken), by less than 2%. This shows that additional education 
that is attained does not add significantly to driver's monthly income but it 
does play some role. This makes sense as to enter this industry, one needs to 
obtain a drivers license and the prerequisite for this is a learner's license. In 
order to pass the latter, one needs to have good literacy skills. But once this is 
achieved, the returns to education seem to be less important. 
Similar analysis can be done for the age and experience variables but the 
coefficients are so small that the result shows that both these variables are 
fairly insignificant at predicting monthly income19. Furthermore, the p-values 
are also very high at 0.919 for experience and 0.996 for age. Human capital 
theory asserts that education and training are key in enhancing economic 
success. The regression has shown that within the mini-bus taxi industry in 
South Africa, this theory does not hold as education, age and experience are 
not good predictors of increased earnings. It is interesting to examine the rest 
of the variables in order to ascertain which variables strongly influence 
earnings. 
Table 2 in the preceding section, highlighted that working in either a rural or 
urban setting had a strong impact on the driver's earning capacity. Thus, 
19 Two variables, age squared and experience squared were also included in the regression equation but 











dummy variables were introduced into the regression equation, which 
represented the differing areas of work and residence. The urban Gauteng 
dummy is omitted as the control so the area dummies must therefore be 
interpreted as relative to living in urban Gauteng. The urban KwaZulu Natal 
dummy, which has a positive coefficient, shows that working here translates 
to higher earnings than if one were working in urban Gauteng. The p-value 
associated with this is relatively high so the effect of this is not significant. On 
the other hand, the rural Limpopo and rural KwaZulu Natal p-values are both 
significant at the 3,4% and 0% levels, respectively. The coefficients are also 
negative highlighting that working in these areas yields lower earnings than if 
one were working in urban Gauteng. Specifically, working in rural Limpopo 
translates to 18% lower earnings while living in rural KwaZulu Natal yields 
30% lower earnings. Stated differently, the result means that a driver in rural 
KwaZulu Natal can expect to earn 70% of the monthly income that a driver 
working in urban Gauteng earns. 
Another variable that proved to be a key factor in determining earnings was 
the daily distance covered by drivers. Table 7 in the preceding section 
showed that earnings start increasing after drivers have reached and continue 
to exceed the 400-kilometre mark. The above regression table shows that 
when considering the distances above 400km, there is definite scope for 
improved earnings. Specifically the 500 < 1000km range shows that income 
can be expected to be higher by almost 22% at a p-value of 1 %. The negative 
coefficient for those traveling less than 300 kilometres a day makes sense, 
although it is not significant; it shows that at lesser distances, drivers can 
expect to earn less income. Clearly then additional distance traveled adds to 
earnings as was seen in the analysis in the previous section. 
It has also been established that additional hours or days worked do not 
necessarily translate to higher earnings. Examining the regression table 
confirms this. The p-values continue to be high and can thus show that a 
strong relationship does not exist between monthly income and these 
aforementioned variables. Correlation analysis was also briefly performed on 











variables. Intuitively, one would expect a strong correlation to exist between 
distance traveled and hours worked. A simple test showed that the correlation 
between these two variables was weak, at 0.132. (Similarly the correlation 
between distance traveled and days worked was also insignificant at 0.07) 
What does seem to be significant though is the next variable examined in the 
regression equation. A dummy highlighting problems with leave is introduced 
into the equation with interesting results. The value that appears is the 
response if one does not have problems with taking leave. This is significant 
as the p-value is very small at 0.005 and this means that if you do not have 
problems when taking leave, you can expect to earn 14% more than those 
that do have problems with their leave arrangements. The final variable in the 
equation looks at idle time and what becomes clear is that irrespective of how 
much additional time drivers spend waiting for commuters, they are not 
guaranteed higher earnings. 
In summation then it seems that the human capital theory that examines 
determinants of income is not in operation in this industry. Education, age and 
experience do not have a direct relationship with the income that drivers earn. 
More logical variables like the days worked, hours worked and waiting time 
also do not seem to influence monthly income. Two variables that stand out 
most clearly are the area in which one works and the daily distance traveled. 
These two variables cannot be seen in isolation as they have a strong linkage. 
That is, in more urban areas, drivers cover greater distances. This makes 
intuitive sense as in metropolitan areas. there are more commuters and their 
transport needs far exceed those of people living in rural areas. All these 
results support the findings in the previous section. 
In the final analysis. it seems that it really is all about the routes plied. This is 
the major determinant of profits and thus incomes in this industry. The more 
lucrative the routes, the more sought after they are. Over trading becomes 
inevitable and violence erupts. The fact that the number of entrants is not 
regulated will ultimately lead to over trading. This is an industry that has made 











whatever means have been deemed necessary. Lawlessness has been rife 
and correcting this state of informality is imperative to ensure that only fair and 
healthy competition thrives, where the status of employees is elevated to that 
of an asset to the employers. 
The next section examines the progress that the South African government 











5. REGULATION OF THE TAXI INDUSTRY BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
GOVERNMENT 
Thus far, what stands out is that the government has an important role to play 
with regard to improving the working conditions of taxi drivers. Government is 
required to put processes in place that ensure that all practices conform to the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
75 of 1997. Basic wages and benefits should be enforced on the employers 
and non-compliance should be deemed illegal. In fact, the plethora of public 
pronouncements made since the first term of the African National Congress-
led government of national unity subsequently attests to this commitment. 
After the new government came into power in 1994, the taxi industry has 
indeed seen significant changes. We begin by examining key reports 
commissioned by the government then we will examine the practical 
measures that have been instituted. 
The government recognizes that there are problems in this sector and that for 
its capacity to be expanded certain reforms need to be undertaken. The White 
Paper on Transport, 1997 identified a number of key national objectives that 
include that: 
no household should spend more than 10% of its income on transport, 
no person should have to travel more than 40km or for more than an hour 
to/from work, 
and that 80% of all motorized trips should be by public transport20 . 
The White Paper also emphasized that public transport should be made safer 
and more environmentally friendly . Further research was undertaken by the 
government in order to establish how these objectives would be realized and 
for this purpose, a team was set up to investigate this. This team consisted of 
a range of stakeholders within the transport industry and together they 
produced the Moving South Africa (MSA) Report of 1999. The MSA report 












Paper would be virtually impossible to achieve. This report did offer key 
recommendations, which include21 : 
'densifying' transport routes, such that routes that had low demand were 
to be self sustainable and not be dependant on state subsidization, 
The main public transport modes in South Africa, namely the railway lines, 
bus services and taxi services should be better linked and transfer from 
one mode to the other should be effortless 
subsidies to unprofitable systems should be abandoned 
competitive tendering should be introduced to improve company 
performance 
The MSA 1999 states that if these features are in place, then customer 
satisfaction will improve thus more people will make use of public transport, 
thus creating more jobs in this sector. The problem with advocating the 
densifying of routes is that this only makes sense "from an economies of scale 
perspective but one cannot seriously expect rural passengers to 'self-sustain' 
their transport needs. Denying these individuals adequate transportation 
stunts their development potential especially since one of the deterrants of 
rural investment is lack of transport and infrastructure. The World Bank22 
further reiterates this view as they state that transport is central to 
development and without physical access to jobs, health, education and other 
amenities, quality of life suffers. Furthermore, without physical access to 
resources and markets, growth stagnates and poverty reduction cannot be 
sustained. This report further emphasizes that with rural transport 
improvements, agricultural production costs have been lowered directly as 
there is greater access to markets and credit; and indirectly by facilitating the 
development of the non-agricultural rural economy. People living in rural 
areas are generally the poorest South Africans and it is essential that the 
government cater for the needs of this sector of the population. 
While these key reports were published and debated, steps to transforming 
the industry were taking shape. This process began in April 1995 when a 
National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) was formed to gather information in order to 
21 http://W\vw.salawu.org.zaiseclorsITransport/govt%20poliCY%20summary.htm 
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identify issues and problems facing the minibus taxi industry. This process 
continued over a period of one year and Interim Recommendations were 
released. These were circulated to relevant stakeholders and the Final 
Recommendations were drafted. The critical issues that arose were the 
following: 
1. Formalising the Minibus taxi industry 
2. Regulating and controlling the Minibus taxi industry 
3. Training and capacity-building 
4. Creating conditions for economic survival, sustainability and 
empowermene3. 
In view of the taxi violence within the Western Cape, the Provincial Cabinet 
approved the formalisation process in October 1996. This effectively meant 
that this was a legal and not a voluntary matter. At the end of 1996, a 
Provincial Taxi Working Group (PTWG) was formed in the Western Cape. The 
purpose of this was to aid in speeding up the registration and legalisation 
initiative. The functions of this group were then broken down into activities of 
eight focus groups. These focus groups constituted of a cross-section of 
various role players within the industry. Specifically, these focus groups 
looked into legalisation, registration, route identification and marking, 
enforcement and legislation, taxi liaison and office administration, economic 
restructuring, training as well as communication. 
An information booklet produced by the Department of Transport and Public 
Works states that the purpose of the legalisation focus group is to facilitate the 
issuing of permits to illegal operators (pirates) who meet the required criteria 
and also to amend existing permits to clearly identify the routes to be plied. 
The registration process is meant to establish a register of the Minibus-Taxi 
Associations so that it is clear whom the individual taxi operators are, what 
vehicles they drive and also what routes they may use. By June 1998, 137 
associations, 3999 operators and 5969 vehicles were registered in the 
Western Cape24 . 
23 Department of Transport and Publ ic Works information booklet 











There have been positive developments in other provinces as well. In 1994, 
the government of KwaZulu Natal inherited a taxi industry with numerous 
problems including a sector with shrinking profits, substandard service, 
violence and weak institutional capacity. The KZN department of transport 
(DOT) then embarked on a process to improve the situation. The process 
started after the passing of the Interim Minibus Taxi Act, Act 22 of 199825. 
The KZN-DOT began by regulating the industry by ensuring that taxis were 
registered and issued with route-specific permits. The registration process 
began in September 1998 and was completed in October 2000. At the end of 
the process, 252 associations, 12 000 taxis and 22 000 vehicles were 
registered. The legislation process then centred on ensuring that vehicles had 
a valid certificate of fitness, rank permits from relevant municipalities and 
route details for vehicles within the different associations26 . Furthermore 
education and training (which includes advanced driver training) as well as 
conflict resolution mechanisms were established. 
The KZN Department of Transport feels that the success of this process was 
owing to the introduction of taxi co-operatives, which brought together taxi 
associations so that powerful bargaining bodies could be formed in order to 
access social and economic investment. Although there is still some taxi 
violence, the DOT has established capable mechanisms to deal with this 
through the contlict resolution support available to the taxi industry. Over and 
above conflict resolutions, local government has to meet other core strategic 
objectives. These include empowerment, public private partnerships, sectorial 
recapitalisation and democratisation. In terms of empowerment, joint 
ventures have been set up with established bus companies and large 
contracts have been broken up for Small Medium and Micro Enterprise 
(SMME) development. The intention is that empowerment firms can 
participate fully within the transport sector and thus reap higher rewards. The 
Umthombo Investment Company is a good example of the public/private 
partnership. Democratisation of the industry has started in order to ensure 













that democratic associations are elected that are accountable for their 
members' actions27. 
In order to address the problems of shrinking profits and an ageing taxi fleet, 
the government has also embarked on a recapitalisation process. What this 
proposes is that 18 and 35 seater vehicles are manufactured to replace the 
existing ageing and unsafe fleets. The DOT states that the financing of these 
vehicles will be such that the monthly repayment burden is lowered and a 
maintenance plan will be in place so as to ensure that these new models 
achieve higher resale values after four years. This is all intended to improve 
the safety standards within this industry28. These are the initiatives that 
government has in place but it is important to establish the views of other 
stakeholders. 
Davies (2000) acknowledges that this programme has great potential for 
economic growth and job creation as the project will mean an investment of 
more than R3 billion over a five year period . He continues to state that this 
project will also bring about savings of millions, as there will be improvements 
in the efficiency and effectiveness of the taxi industry. Currently, the average 
age of taxis is ten years but one of the stipulations of this project is that the 
18-seaters should have a four-year life span and that the 35-seaters should 
be limited to a seven-year life span. Davies (2000) emphasises that the 
recapitalisation programme is not expected to disadvantage existing taxi 
owners and that the simplistic argument that replacing 126 000 taxis with 85 
000 new ones will leave 41 000 drivers without jobs. The speaker contends 
that this is not based on a logical or innovative consideration of the 
implications of the recapitalisation programme. It is stated that significant new 
opportunities in support, service and supply industries will provide access to 
new, better and more sustainable jobs. Perhaps we should turn to the 













COSATU and its affiliate, the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) 
support this governmental programme and offer a number of reasons for this 
stance. The registration of all operators will remove unscrupulous and illegal 
operators thus legitimizing this industry. The TGWU states that it does not 
deny that there will eventually be fewer drivers in the system but there are 
benefits. With the regulation of conditions of work, TGWU anticipates that 
drivers will no longer be subject to working 20 hours a day and on long 
distance routes, two drivers will be the norm. This body states that the 
recapitalisation process will have positive externalities in the sense that there 
will be expansion of services, maintenance, fuel supply and taxi ranking. This 
will create new jobs and drivers will be given first option of retraining to move 
into these areas29 . Thale (2001) states that the government also intends on 
improving taxi ranks and training queue marshals. This is then possibly one of 
the other employment routes that drivers may take. 
Another special feature of this initiative is that the new vehicle models will 
carry on-board computers that will record passenger numbers and hours on 
the road. TGWU feels that this will make it easier to set a fair wage across the 
board thus eliminating exploitation of drivers. This initiative will also improve 
safety, as the new models have to adhere to strict safety specifications. In 
terms of financing, the new models will be more expensive than the existing 
ones as they have to meet specific safety requirements but the government 
will be paying 20-30% of the cost of the new vehicles. This will occur through 
the proposed scrapping allowance. Furthermore, owners will now have 
access to preferential interest rates in order to finance the remaining costs. 
TGWU also promotes this as stakeholders will now be paying taxes and this 
also promotes the local manufacture of vehicles. The overall sentiment is that 
the taxi industry will no longer be characterised by violence, poor working 
conditions, a lack of safety and a lack of job security. What will be in place is 













there will be an end to violence as there will no longer be an over saturation in 
the number of taxis in the industry3o. 
What also needs to be noted though is that the specifications of these new 
models includes that they be diesel powered, with wheelchair access and the 
smart card vending will ensure convenient cashless transactions. This will 
ensure that the disabled are catered for but the cash collector's jobs may also 
be eliminated. According to African Business (2001) smart cards will unlock 
the regulation of routes, control of fares, keep accurate commuter counts and 
translate all of this into a transparent cash flow. With well-documented funds, 
taxi bosses will be able to use this as leverage for any retail or banking 
transactions they may want to do. 
According to the Mail andGaurdian(Nov2002).by 2004, all taxis will have to 
comply with the basic safety features. There is also a second deadline in 
2006; this requires that taxis must have th~ features required of the new 
generation models. These include higher safety standards and compliance 
with the smartcard payment system. There is a belief that because of delays, 
these dates may be postponed. Mabasa, a SANTAC031 spokesperson, states 
(in Mail and Guardian) that they are not against the recapitalisation plans but 
the process is moving too slowly. The result is that those with old vehicles 
cannot replace them as they are waiting for the new generation models. This 
means that unsafe taxis are on the road and are further worsening the 
situation. Taxi operators are obviously unwilling to invest in a new vehicle if 
they are to become illegal in four years time. Mabasa also states that they are 
not happy with the fact that the government has in fact not released the prices 
of these new vehicles therefore it is difficult to assess exactly how reasonable 
this offer is. Another issue is that the government has as yet not concluded 
the formalisation programme and this is seen as holding up the transformation 
of the industry. Government is in the process of ironing out these issues but 
what we also need to consider is the impact of these shocks on the demand 
of transport services offered by the mini-bus taxi industry. This is best done by 
30 
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deploying analyses on the elasticity of demand, as this is likely to have a 
significant impact on the industry. In essence we also want to examine the 











5.1 WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT TRADE OFFS 
Introducing a minimum wage is intended to benefit those involved in that 
industry but what is a possibility is that others within that industry may find 
themselves redundant. The size of this redundancy depends on the elasticity 
factor applicable to that industry. In fact, the term elasticity can be viewed 
from two different perspectives. Firstly, there is the issue of labour demand 
elasticities. What this means is that we have to question the effect of an 
increase in wages on overall employmenez. If we find that labour demand is 
indeed elastic, this means that with increases in incomes, we can expect to 
see (significant) disemployment effects. The main interest then lies in the 
magnitude of any disemployment. The other area of focus is on price/income 
elasticity. Here we consider that with all the new legislation and regulation of 
minibus taxis, it is likely that we will see some increase in the price of taxi 
fares. The question here is if prices go up, how much would the demand for 
taxis drop by. These are the two issues that we will explore within this section. 
According to Sapsford and Tzannatos (1993) the demand for labour as a 
factor of production is a derived demand, as labour is not demanded for its 
own sake but rather for its contribution to the production process. These 
authors then introduce Marshall's four rules for derived demand, which state 
that the elasticity of labour will be greater, the 
• Greater the elasticity of substitution in production 
• Greater the elasticity of demand for the final product 
• Greater the share of labour in total cost 
• Greater the elasticity of supply of the other factor of production. 
The first point states that if it is easy to substitute capital for labour and the 
price of labour increases, then its consequent demand will decrease. In the 
case of the taxi industry, this should not occur. If all taxi drivers demanded a 
monthly wage of R1500, it is clear that they cannot be substituted. 
Hypothetically, the only substitution that may occur is that more desperate 
drivers may accept lower incomes but if all drivers insisted on this higher 
32 Ehrenberg & Smith (2000) term this 'own-wage elasticity of demand' and this is defined as the 











wage, then owners would have to accept this. Drivers cannot be replaced by 
machines and based on this pOint; we see a more inelastic demand. 
The second point states that if the demand for the final product is elastic, so 
too will the elasticity of labour. In our instance, the final product is providing a 
service in the form of transportation for the community at large. Clark and 
Crous (1999) state that in the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA), minibus taxi 
fares are the most expensive for any given distance and that third class rail is 
the cheapest mode of transportation. We will revisit price elasticities later on 
but what one can already gather is that should taxi fares rise (as a result of an 
increase in labour costs), a number of commuters will choose to use other 
modes of transportation. This point leads us to believe then that we see an 
elastic demand for labour. 
The following issue looks at the ratio of labour costs to total costs. Kang 
(1998) states that the taxi industry is highly labour intensive and that labour 
costs usually exceed more than 50% of the operating costs. This may lead 
one to conclude that we have an elastic demand for labour. But the issue 
does not end here. What we have considered are operating costs only; if we 
consider total costs, a different picture emerges. With the recapitalisation 
initiative, we can expect to see the figure for total costs shooting up, as all 
owners must buy new vehicles. The entire population of employers will now 
have significant debt. The issue is really about how much we can expect 
these costs to rise. If they rise significantly, then the ratio of labour costs to 
total costs will also decrease. This would then lead us to believe that there is 
in fact an inelastic demand for labour. That is, if the price of labour goes up, 
the overall effect on total costs will be slight such that we can expect to see 
insignificant disemployment effects. Depending on the outcome, it is not 
possible to ascertain the exact point at which we have an elastic or inelastic 
demand. 
The last point states that if the price of labour increases and the owner 
attempts to switch to another factor of production (like capital) and this switch 











In terms of the taxi industry, this is not the case as the switch cannot be 
costless thus we see an inelastic demand. 
This then leads one to believe that in fact if wages are increased, it may not 
have significant disemployment effects if these costs are borne by the 
employee or the government (possibly through the means of a subsidy). We 
could expect to see disemployment effects if the costs were passed onto the 
consumer. Before we consider this, let us examine the wage elasticity of 
employment. The problem here is the fact that we are dealing with the 
informal sector and there is very little available wage elasticity work. The more 
accepted figures are for the formal sector. Nonetheless, a simulation model 
will be used to establish the potential job losses that may occur as a result of 
a minimum wage. It must be noted that any job losses will affect only those 
workers currently earning below the minimum wage. Fallon and Lucas (1998) 
study the South African case and establish that the short run wage elasticity is 
-0.156 and that in the long run, this figure across aI/ sectors is -0.71. These 
figures are derived when looking specifically at Black33 formal sector 
employment. 
Using the taxi industry survey, four possible minima were established: 
R1000 
R1200 (taxi driver's monthly income before deductions, median) 
R1800 
R2000 (taxi driver's perceptions of what constitutes a fair minimum wage, 
the median value) 
These minima are simply four arbitrary wage levels that were chosen to 
illustrate the effects of a minimum wage. One of the questions in the surveys 
asks what drivers consider being a fair minimum wage and the response was 
R2000. In fact R2000 is the median value and this is included in the analysis 
as it captures the perceptions of drivers. 
The first step in the simulation model was to identify how many individuals 
earned less than the above-specified minima. 
33 Fallon and Lucas (1998) consider Blacks to refer to all South A fricans other than White, which 











Table 16: Number and Percentage of drivers earning less than the 
Minima 








(1 ) 1000 100 I 24.04% 
(2) 1200 165 39.66% 
(3) 1800 373 89.66% 
(4) 2000 380 I 91.35% 
Thereafter, one has to establish the current wage bill. This is calculated by 
multiplying the overall mean monthly wage (R 1202,31) by the entire sample of 
drivers that stated what they earned, i.e. the sample has 445 drivers but only 
416 responded to this question. Thus the total wage bill stands at R500 
160,96. Then one has to establish new wage bills corresponding to the 
minima. In the first instance, it implies that one has to ascertain the total wage 
bill if the 100 individuals earning below R1000 are in fact moved up to the 
R1000 mark and then add this to the mean value of those earning R1000 and 
above. 
Table 17: Post Minimum Wage 
Number earning more I Mean if earning more New Wage Bill 
than the minimum than the minimum 
wage i wage 
(1 ) 316 I 1367 531972 
(2) 251 i 1459 564209 
(3) 43 I 2018 758174 
(4) 36 ! 2061 834196 
The next step is to apply the relevant elasticities to ascertain the employment 
effects if these minima were to be instituted. 
Table 18: Simulated Short-run employment effects of Minimum Wage 
settings 
Number '% Short I I % Total , workers Increase run . Elasticity Job 
below min wage bill . elasticity I factor losses i employ i 
1000 100 6.4 0.156 0.9922 0.99 I 0.24% 
, 1200 165 12.8 0.156 1.9977 3.30 i 0.79% 
1800 373 51.6 0.156 8.0474 30.02 I 7.22% 














The results show us that with a 52% rise in the wage bill, we can expect to 
see a 7% reduction in the existing employment level. So the result of a R1800 
minimum wage applied to our sample of drivers earning below the minimum, 
would lead to 30 jobs being lost. In context, this means that of the 373 earning 
less than R1800, 30 would be unemployed, leaving 343 earning at least 
R1800. Also, if the minimum wage is set at R2000, which is a 67% increase in 
the wage bill, we can expect 10% of those earning below this minimum to lose 
their jobs. It has to be highlighted that although we are looking at a sample of 
those involved within this industry, it is true to say that these effects would be 
felt throughout the entire population of drivers operating within this industry in 
South Africa. 
Table 19: Simulated Long-run employment effects of Minimum Wage 
settings 
Number % Long 
workers Increase run Elasticity Job % Total 
below min wage bill elasticity factor losses employ i 
1000 100 6.4 0.71 4.5157 4.52 i 1.09% I 
1200 165 12.8 0.71 9.0919 15.00 3.61% I 
.1800 373 51.6 0.71 36.6261 136.62 i 32.84% : 
2000 380 i 66.8 0.71 47.4177 180.19 43.31% I 
The long run constitutes a time period greater than one year. The elasticity 
figure is significantly higher as employers have more time to adjust to the 
minimum wage and alter their labour utilisation and needs. What we find, is 
with a minimum wage of R1800, a third of those earning below this minimum 
would lose their jobs in the long run. With a R2000 minimum, almost half of 
those earning below this would lose their jobs. 
The resultant employment losses are graphed below where the various 
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Having established, the possible losses, it is important to also examine the 
likely gains. That is we must examine the positive impact of the minimum 
wage on those earning below it. 
Table 20: Wage increase at R1000 Minimum Wage for drivers earning 
below R1000 
Percentile Wage at % Increase Number of Net Number 
percentile as a result of workers 
min wage affected 
1% 250 300 2 
5% 300 233 11 9 
10% 300 233 11 0 
25% 560 79 27 16 
50% 800 25 90 63 
75% 800 25 90 0 
90% 850 18 90 0 
95% 900 11 100 10 
99% 900 11 100 0 
The data above suggests that about a quarter of our sample would benefit 
from a minimum wage set at R 1000. What is also clear, is that the most poor 











with a minimum wage of R1000, there are a few jobs that would be lost (less 
than 1 % in the short run). But if the minimum is set at R1800, 90% of our 
sample would be better off as shown below. For the lowest percentile, 
incomes would increase by 500%. 
Table 21: Wage increase at Ri800 Minimum Wage for drivers earning 
below R1800 
Percentile Wage at % Increase Number of Net Number 
percentile as a result of workers 
min wage affected 
1% 300 500 11 
5% 500 260 20 9 
10% 700 157 43 23 
25% 900 100 100 57 
50% 1200 50 268 168 
75% 1400 29 316 48 
90% 1600 13 372 56 
95% 1600 13 372 0 
99% 1600 13 372 0 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of a Minimum Wage of Ri000 















The above graph makes the effect of a minimum wage clear; those below it 
would then be moved up to this value. Below we have a graph showing the 
effect if a minimum wage of R2000 is used. What is clear is that almost all the 
individuals in the sample would reap significant benefits. 
Figure 4: Graphical representation of a Minimum Wage of R2000 





The issue is then really of a trade off between increasing wages and 
controlling for the resultant losses in employment. 
Table 22: Trade Off between Employment Losses and Wage Gains in the 
Short Run 
Minimum wage Short run % loss in Average % increase as 
employment a result of min wage 
1000 0.24 65.8 
1200 0.79 67.5 
1800 7.22 86.8 
2000 9.52 105.8 
In the short run, we see that with a minimum wage of R1800, on average, 
those earning below this minimum will earn 87%34 more than their current 











income. The problem though is that the associated disemployment effects 
would run at 7%. Similarly, we see the same results below but the 
employment losses are magnified. If a minimum wage of R1800 were to be 
instituted, we would expect 33% of those earning below this to lose their jobs. 
Table 23: Trade Off between Employment Losses and Wage Gains in the 
Long Run 
Minimum wage Long run % loss in Average % increase as 
employment a result of min wage 
1000 1.09 65.8 
1200 3.61 67.5 
1800 32.84 86.8 
2000 43.31 105.8 
Any employment losses are never welcomed but within the context of the taxi 
industry, there are more complex issues at play. Firstly, there is an urgent 
need that incomes within this industry be increased, as safety mechanisms 
are non-existent for drivers. Taxi drivers have no medical aid, no pension 
fund, no unemployment insurance fund or any life insurance. For drivers to 
attain these, their incomes need to be increased. Also, the government's 
recapitalisation initiative aims to replace 126 000 taxis with 85 00035 taxis, so 
disemployment is inevitable. In fact with recapitalisation, we can expect to see 
33% less taxis on the road. Before this recapitalisation is accepted by 
stakeholders, government has to prove how it intends to re-employ the 41 000 
drivers who will have no taxis to drive. 
But this argument does not end here as we have yet to consider the effects of 
this should employers or government pass on the wage increase and/or 
recapitalisation costs to the consumer. In fact we want to ascertain the price 
elasticity of demand. Neubrech and Pienaar (2001) use co-integration 
analysis to establish price, cross-price and income elasticities of demand for 
public road transport in the Cape Metropolitan Area. Their analysis yields 
some interesting results and these include that bus and taxi services are 
substitute products and that the short run elasticity for taxi fares is 6,7 while 











the long run elasticity stands at 3%. The authors state that there are high-
generalized costs that commuters attach to minibus taxi transport (these 
include taxi-related violence and high accident rates associated with this 
industry) and as a result, they are less willing to pay for taxi services. The 
direct result then is that the demand is highly elastic, which means that in the 
short term, should the fares increase by R1, a corresponding 6.7% decrease 
in demand is to be expected. (For example if we have 10 000 commuters 
using taxis daily and the fare increases by R2, we can expect to see 1340 
less people using taxi services) 
Another study by Hendriks and Lyne (2003) offers similar results. The focus 
moves away from the Western Cape and these writers examine 99 rural 
households (these households are in the rural areas of Swayimana and 
Umzumbe) in the KwaZulu Natal province. What is established here is that 
these residents rely heavily on minibus taxis for transport and their 
regressions show that expenditure elasticities for transport were very high. In 
fact for Swayimana, this elasticity stood at 8,30 and for Umzumbe this was 
lower, yet still elastic at 2,52. This re-iterates the above conclusion that 













The South African minibus taxi industry is rooted within the informal sector yet 
it also exists within the periphery of the formal sector. Operators in this 
industry adhere to some regulations, which include driver licensing and traffic 
regulations yet do not comply with numerous standard business practices 
characteristic of the formal sector. This industry has developed in an 
unregulated environment and the time has come for it to shed its informality 
and join the mainstream economy. 
Deregulation of the industry opened up numerous opportunities for 
(predominantly) Africans to empower themselves and earn a better living. But 
this regime did not control the number of entrants and soon over-saturation of 
vehicles ensued and excessive competition drove down profits and violence 
ensued. On the other hand. a regulatory environment would serve to eliminate 
the negative effects of deregulation by ensuring better working conditions of 
employment for drivers. A regulatory regime would eliminate informality and 
through the recapitalisation process, it would assure a more sustainable 
environment for the investment of durable assets by the participants and 
stakeholders in the industry. 
What is imperative to note is that deregulation increased employment yet it 
also led to exploitative labour practices. This is where the notion of a trade off 
is most important. Economic regulation can restrict firms in terms of price, 
quantity and entry into and out of markets and Melton (1978) contends that 
regulation, through placing limitations on entrants. breeds unemployment. It is 
those that remain within the industry that benefit. Thus regulatory 
interventions that are activated through state poliCies have to preserve the 
positive and beneficial impact that has resulted and upon which a wide 
spectrum of beneficiaries are dependent but it also has to mitigate the 












Unemployment in South Africa, when broadly defined, is estimated at over 
40% of the economically active population. This country cannot afford to shed 
jobs; it is vital that it creates them. Yet the government's recapitalisation 
process will invariably lead to a decreased number of operators who will most 
probably be better off than their current status. What is critical is the quality of 
jobs that are preserved be infinitely better than the quality of jobs, which have 
been discarded. Is it not better to employ fewer people in jobs where they 
earn a living wage that restores their dignity rather than employing many more 
people in jobs that exploit them? 
Another limitation that exists with operating within the informal economy is 
that expansion of businesses is constrained and bigger and more cost-
effective scales of production are difficult to achieve. Taxi owners operate 
without significant collateral and this denies them access to formal sector 
capital. A regulated and transparent system would bridge this void and 
enhance the capabilities of owners. The government's recapitalisation 
programme, through it's regulating of working conditions, offers drivers better 
prospects and owners also benefit from the introduction of smart cards and 
the preferential interest rates that will be in line for them. The smart cards will 
keep accurate commuter counts and will translate into a transparent cash flow 
system. This will then provide evidence to financial institutions of their credit 
worthiness. This recapitalisation programme will also benefit the economy, as 
owners will now be paying taxes. 
In spite of all these likely benefits, one cannot shirk from the possible 
disemployment effects. The Survey of wages and employment conditions 
highlighted the vulnerability of the respondents and that of the members of 
their households, as they depended heavily on the wages earned from the 
taxi industry. The recapitalisation programme, will on a straight-line basis 
render about 40 000 taxi drivers jobless. It has been stated that those that find 
themselves jobless will be filtered back into the system as support staff. Since 
only so many can be trained as rank marshals, the rest of the drivers will be 
used as maintenance staff. This argument falls short because these new 











arising need to be sent to the manufacturer. The manufacturers already have 
trained and experienced staff that are well equipped to deal with any 
problems. 
Disemployment or even a loss of profits may occur in a different way. That is, 
should the price of taxi fares rise, commuters may switch to traveling by rail or 
bus and this may irrevocably damage the taxi industry. Considering that the 
recapitalisation programmes involves regulating conditions of work, which 
could include shortened working hours, increased salaries and additional 
benefits such as pension and medical aid, the question remains, who will foot 
this bill? Owners have new taxis to purchase, which will be considerably more 
expensive even though government intends on offering some scrapping 
allowance. These new taxis, which have as yet not had price tags attached to 
them, will consume much of the owners' resources. Perhaps then government 
will subsidise this industry but this is not yet clear. 
As the dominant party in the national government, the African National 
Congress has an electoral pledge to uphold, a pledge that promises "A Better 
Life for All". In light of this, it has a crucial balancing act to perform by 
ensuring that its interventions to bring about effective transformation at 
various tiers of the economy and the society are successfully carried through 
without being reduced to a breakdown of proper governance. By formal ising 
this industry, many will be made better off but many other relevant 
stakeholders may be left out in the cold. But this is the nature of any 
transformation: there will be those that survive and those that do not but 
safety mechanisms must be in place to assist the displaced. The South 
African minibus taxi industry is indeed at the crossroads and the array of 
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Calculation of T ablE~ 22, page 63: 
In order to establish the average percentage increase because of the 
minimum wage, the following was done for each minima. 
Example for a minimum wage of R1800: 
I Monthly Percentage I Number at that I % Increase*Number I 
i Income below Increase , Level I at that Level 
1 R1800 I _ .. _~ 
L-. 1760 0.0227 1.1 I . 0.0227 I 
L,-I_-~-~~-~~--+---_0,-:--o1.=~-=-5 ~---l----~ ... ~ ~ .. ---+-~.. 521.~5 
1440 0.25 1· 0.25 . 
~-----::-::-----+--
1400 0.2857 37 10.5709 
1360 0.3235 1 0.3235 
135_0 _--+-___ 0--:.3c-c-3_33 _ .. ~' __ -::-1 0.3333---i 
1300 0.3846 8 3.0768· 
f----1..:.-25-0--+,----0-c-.-44----+1---1 0.44 
1200 I 0.51 103 51.5 
1100 0.636 2.544 
:-----1-12-0-±---'-· =--=--0:-6-07---1--
1 
.--. 42 1.214 
---------~----------T-------------~ 
,----.. _1_00_0_-+1 __ --.:...0-=.8~ __ i__' __ 5_9 ___ --+ ___ 4_7_.2 __ -1 
1 90.c...0_. __ ---li ___ ----:_1~-_ -1--___ 1_0 __ --+ ____ 1_0_. ___ ---1 
·1 800 I 1.25 45 1 56.25 
~-~~--~---------:~----+----------:---~---~~~-------
I 760 i 1.368 1 1 1.368 
i 750 ----;-:---1-.4-----+--------1----'-1----1.-4-------, 
f-----------,--------------+-----------+------._-------'. 
i 700 I 1.571 10 15.71 I 
i 600 I 2 6 12 I 
~-56-0 I 2.214 7 --1C-::5--:.4-9-:-8--~' 
500 i 2.6 4 10.4 
400 I 3.5 4 14 
: 350--+-1 ----4-.14-2-·--'-----1-·-·--+----4-.-1-42----1 
! 300 I 5 8 40 1 
:- 280 5.428 1 --=5-.4-0-20:-8 ----4 
:--_2_50 __ -,-1 __ 6.2 2 12.4 I 
L-._T_o_ta_l_ L_~2.5808 373 324.00 ._~ 
The first column slhows the actual income if one earns below R1800, while the 
third column shows the number of those earning at that level. The second 
column shows by how much the income actually goes up. Let us consider the 
last line: we see that two people earn R250. 250*6.2 = 1550. This means that 
if you earn R250, you can expect to earn an additional R1550 to get R1800. 
The final column shows the total gain at each level and the average gain is 
calculated as 324.1373 = 86,86%. So, on average, each person's income goes 
























Questionnaire for Employees 
A Sectoral Detennination for the Taxi Industry ---------- --------~--------------~ 
QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER INTERVIEWER CODE 
Interview date DD/MM/YY SUPERVISOR CODE 
Hello, my name is ..... I am working for a research NGO called CAS E. The Department of 
Labour has commissioned this survey which is being undertaken in three South African 
provinces. They would like to learn more about earnings and working conditions in the taxi 
industry. Based on the findings of this survey, the Department of Labour will advise the 
Minister of Labour on the introduction of a minimum wage and appropriate working 
conditions in the taxi sector. Things you tell us will help the Department of Labour to 
regulate and improve wages and working conditions for all employees who work in the taxi 
industry. Therefore, it is important that the information you give me is as honest and 
accurate as possible. 
You have been selected to be interviewed along with 450 other taxi industry employees. 
Your answers will be kept completely confidential and not shared with your employer or any 
other person outside of this project. We are only asking for your name and contact 
information so somebody from CAS E can check if this interview has been conducted with 
I you. Nobody will be able to identify your personal answers. This is your opportunity to tell i 
us what you really think. J 
Taxi employee 




Interviewer: Only administer this questionnaire if the potential respondent is employed by 
or hires the taxi from another person who owns the taxi they drive. Do not administer this 
questionnaire to drivers who own their taxi, 










I certify that this interview has been completed in full, with the respondent and according to the 
instructions I received from CAS E. 
SIGNED: 
(interviewer's signature) 
Su ervisor check: ___ . _______ ~ ____________________ ___, 
I certify that I have checked this questionnaire and to my knowledge: 
it is fully completed and the respondent was correctly selected according to CASE's instructions 
SIGNED: 
(fieldwork supervisor's signature) 
FOR SUPERVISOR'S USE ONL Y 
CtiECK-B~CK VIsiT:-A-~heck- backhas~bee-n7has not beenca~~ied out onl:hiS-questionnaire (cirdel 
correct option) Date carned out: C· .... · . ../. ...... ./03) I 
If check-back has been done, by whom was it done? (circle correct option) 
Fieldwork supervisor 
Contract fieldworker 
CAS E staffer 
Result of check-back: 



















2. Area type [CODE BY OBSERVATION.] 
Metropolitan / Urban Johannesburg (G) , 
I 
Metropolitan / Urban - Durban (KZN) I 2 
Metropolitan 1 Urban - Polokwane 1 Pietersburg (l) 3 
Small urban 1 peri-urban Krugersdorp area (G) 4 
Small urban I peri-urban East Rand area (G) 5 
I Rural Matlala area (l) 6 
Rural- Matoks area (l) 7 
Rural - Boyne area (l) 8 
Rural Ulundi area (KZN) 9 
Rural - Msinga area (KZN) 10 
I Rural - Empangeni area (KZN) 11 
3. Name of taxi rank I Name of town or village where taxi rank is situated [IN JHB, DURBAN 
AND POLOKWANE RECORD THE NAME OF THE TAXI RANK. IN ALL OTHER AREAS, RECORD THE NAME OF THE TOWN / 
VILLAGE IN WHICH THE TAXI RANK IS SITUATED.] 
4. Sex of respondent [CODE BY OBSERVATION.] 
Ir-M_al_e~ _______ ·~21 Female I=:J 
s. How old are you? [AGE TO NEAREST YEAR.] 
Years 
6. What is the highest level of education you have passed? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
I No formal education 1 
I Gr. 1/ Sub. A 2 
~-. 
I Gr. 81 Std. 6 9 
Gr. 9/ Std. 7 10 
! Gr. 2 1 Sub. B 3 
Gr. 3 / Std. 1 4 
Gr. 10/ Std. 81 NTC 1 11 
Gr. 11/ Std. 9 / NTC 2 12 
I Gr. 4/ Std. 2 5 Matric 1 Gr. 12/ Std. 101 NTC 3 13 
I 
6 fGr.5/Std.3 
i Gr. 6 / Std. 4 7 
I 
8 , Gr. 7 1 Std. 5 
Diploma / Degree 14 
I Refused 15 
Other (specify) 16 
3 










7. How many people (this includes young children and babies) live in your household 
including yourself? 
8. For how many of these household members (excluding yourself) are you financially 
responsible, i.e. they mainly depend on you to financially support them? 
9. On average, what is your total monthly household income, i.e. your earnings plus 
contributions other members of your household make (including benefits like pensions 
and grants) before any taxes or other deductions. [ONLY RECORD EULL RAND AMOUNTS, NOT 
CENTS. IF RESPONDENT REFUSES, CODE AS '9999'.] 
R 
EMPLOYEE INFORMATION 
10. Have you done any work outside the taxi sector to earn money in the past 7 days? 
R¥ T1i _ ~GotOQ.13 
11. If yes, please describe the type of work you have done outside the taxi industry 
12. How often do you do other work outside the taxi sector? [READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
~ailY ··_··---T-l-j 
~A few times a week I 2 I 
A few times a month 3 
A few times a year 4 
13. For how many years have you been working in the taxi industry? [IF LESS THAN ONE YEAR, 
CODF AS '0'. OTHFR PERIODS SHOULD BE ROUNDED OFF TO THE NEARES FULL YEAR.] 
Years 
14. Please give me a short description of all the tasks you perform at work in the taxi 
sector 
15. For how many years have you had a car driver's license? [IF LESS THAN ONE YEAR, CODE AS '0'. 
OTHER PERIODS SHOULD BE ROUNDED OEF TO THE NEARES FULL YEAR.] 
Years 
16. Do you have a PDP (Public Driver's Permit)? 
GotoQ.18 
~-----------------~.~~------~ 











'L--D_on_'t_kn_o_w ______ --'-__ 3_----" Go to Q. 18 
17. For how many years have you had your PDP License (permission to carry passengers 
in a vehicle)? [IF LESS THAN ONE YEAR, CODE AS '0'. OTHER PERIODS SHOULD BE ROUNDED OFF TO THE NEARES 
FULL YEAR.] 
Years 
LONG & SHORT-DISTANCE DRIVERS 
18. On average, how many kilometres do you drive per day with your taxi? 
Kilometres I Day 
19. Which of these desc:ribes J2g§1 the taxi trips you make in a day? [READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
I make many trips (5 or more), but only short distances (e.g. around town) 
I make 3-4 trips, of medium length distances (e.g. 2 return trips between 2 
towns) 









I make one return trip or less per day (e.g. JHB to Cape Town) 4 I 
Other (specify) 5 i Go to Q.25 
20. If you are driving long distances which require you to sleep away from home, where 
do you mainly sleep during these trips? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
I Sleep in taxi (other driver driving) 1 I i 
I Sleep in taxi (taxi parked somewhere) 2 j 
i 
Renting accommodation for the night 3 I 
Stay with friends / family 4 1 
Other (specify) 5 I 
Never have to sleep away from home 6 I Go to Q. 22 
21. Who pays for your accommodation when you have to sleep over on long-distance 
trips? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
I Employer (taxi owner) pays 1 I How much? I R 
Driver (respondent) pays 2 I 
i No costs involved 3 
I Other (specify) 4 
22. Who pays for your food when you are on a long distance trip? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE 
MENTION.] 
i I How much? 1 R 
, 
Employer (taxi owner) pays 1 
Driver (respondent) pays 2 I 
No costs involved / don't eat food 3 
Other (specify) 4 I 











23. Does your employer (the owner of the taxi) pay for any other expenses when you have 
to drive long distances? 
1 
2 Go to Q.25 
24. Please describe what other expenses your employer covers 
EARNINGS & WORKING HOURS 
25. For how many different employers (taxi owners) do you work in an average week? 
Employ«!r (s) 
26. What best describes the basis on which you are employed? If you have more than one 
employer, please think about the one you work for most of the time. [READ OUT. SINGLE 
MENTION.] 
I receive a fixed wage per week J month 
I get paid by the hour 
I I get paid per day worked 
I get paid a fixed amount for each completed route 
I pay the owner a fixed amount for the taxi & keep the rest of the 
fares 
I receive a share of the daily earnings J fares from the owner of the 
t~ 













Go to Q.29 
Go to Q.29 
Go to Q.29 
Go to Q.29 
Go to Q.28 
GotoQ.29 
27. If you pay the owner of the taxi a fixed amount for the use of the taxi, how much do 
you pay and for what period? [RECORD AMOUNT AND PERIOD, E.G. 'RSOO PER DAY', 'RIOOO PER WEEK', 
'RSOOO PER MONTH' ETC.] 
Amount Time 
Go to Q.29 
28. If you receive a share of the earnings, please describe how this is calculated? 
29. How often do you get paid? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
Daily 1 
Weekly 2 
. Every two weeks 
~.. ------
I Monthly 
30. How much money (after anv deductions) did you take home over the last 7 days? [ONLY 
RECORD FULL RAND AMOUNTS, NOT CENTS. IF RESPONDENT REFUSES, CODE AS '9999'.] 
R 
6 










31. On average, what is your monthly income from working in the taxi industry before any 
taxes or other deductions? [ONLY RECORD FULL RAND AMOUNTS, NOT CENTS. IF RESPONDENT REFUSES, 
CODE AS '9999'.] 
R 



















Go to Q.34 
Go to Q.34 
Go to Q.34 
33. Why do you work less than five days per week in the taxi sector? 
34. What time did you start and end work each day during the previous week? [USE 24 HOUR 
CLOCK TO RECORD TIMES, I.E. '8 :00', '14:30', '20: 45' ETC. IF RESPONDENT HAS NOT WORKED ON A PARTICULAR 
DAY, CODE AS '00:00'.] 
35. Which best describes how your break times are structured? [READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
Can take breaks anytime I want (no earnings) 1 I 
Take breaks when I have to wait for fares 2 ! 
Have fixed break times set by employer 3 
Other (specify) 4 I 
36. On average, how long is your daily lunch break? 
Minutes I day 
37. Do you receive any pay for the time you spend on your lunch break? 
38. Approximately how much time do you have for other breaks per day? 
Minutes I day 
39. Do you receive any pay for the time you spend on other break periods? 
Yes 1 
7 










40. On average, how many hours per day do you spend at work, that is driving, waiting for 
fares at the taxi rank and break periods? 
Hours I day 
41. On an average day, how many hours per day do you spent waiting for fares at the taxi 
rank? 
Hours I day 
42. How often do you work on ... ? [READ OUT. ONE MENTION EACH.] 
I 
I ... Saturdays ... Sundays I .-
I Every week 1 1 I 
Once every two weeks 2 2 I 
Once a month 3 3 I 
A few times a year 4 4 ! 
Never 5 5 I If '5' is circled for both Saturday & Sunday, go to Q.45 
43. Compared to weekdays, do you work longer or shorter hours on ... [READ OUT. ONE MENTION 
EACH.] 
... Saturdays ... Sundays 
I Shorter hours 
Same hours 2 2 
Longer hours 3 3 
Don't work 4 4 
44. Do you get any additional pay from your employer for working on Saturdays or 
Sundays? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
No, same as on weekdays 
I 
More on Saturdays or Sundays 2 i 
I More on Sundays only 3 i 
I Don't work on Saturdays or Sundays 4 I 
Get other form of compensation (describe) 5 i 
45. Do you generally work on public holidays? 
GotOQ.48 
46. Compared to normal work days, do you work longer or shorter hours on public 
holidays? 
_._-- --
l:'horter hours 1 
, ~.--------------
Same hours 2 
Longer hours 3 











47. Do you get any additional pay when working on public holidays? [DO NOT READ OUT.] 
No, same as on weekdays 1 
I 
More than on weekdays 2 I Reason? 
Less than on weekdays 3 Reason? 
Get other form of compensation 4 
(describe) I 
48. How do you think 'overtime' is defined in the taxi industry? 
49. Do you ever work overtime? 
Go to Q. 51 
50. How do you get compensated for working overtime? 
----~ .. ----~ .. -----.------------
51. If you had a choice, which of these two work arrangements would you prefer more? 
[READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
Hire the taxi for fixed amount from owner and keep the remaining 
profits 
Get fixed amount from owner for driving his taxi 
1 
2 
52. Can you think of any other work arrangement you would like to have the most? 
.-.-.--.------------~ 
53. If drivers were to receive a fixed wage from the owner of the taxi, what would you 
consider to be a fair minimum wage for taxi drivers? [ONE RESPONSE ONLY.] 
R per hour or 
R per day or 
R per week or 
R per month 
OPERA TlNG COSTS 
54. Do you normally have a fare collector in your taxi? 
Go to Q.58 
55. Does the fare collector get paid for this work? 
Go to Q.58 












56. Who pays that fare collector? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
The driver (respondent) of the taxi 1 I 
The owner of the taxi 2 I 
Other (specify) 3 I i 
57. How much does the fair collector generally get paid per day? [ONLY RECORD FULL RAND 
AMOUNTS, NOT CENTS. IF RESPONDENT REFUSES, CODE AS '999'. IF RESPONDENTS DOES NOT KNOW, CODE AS 
'888'.] 
Rand I day 
58. Who covers the cost of the petrol for the taxi you drive? [Do NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
The driver of the taxi (respondent) 1 I 
The owner of the taxi 2 I 
I 
Both owner and driver 3 I 
Other (specify) 4 
I 
I 
59. Who covers the regular cost of the maintenance (services etc) of the taxi? 
hTh~r of the taxi (resp~~~ent) __ l--_l~J 
The owner of the taxi 2 I 
I Both owner and driver 3 I 
I 
~r (specify) 4 
60. Who covers the cost of cleaning the vehicle? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLF MENTION.] 
The driver of the taxi (respondent) 1 I I 
The owner of the taxi .~ 
Both owner and driver 3 
Other (specify) 4 
61. If you are in an accident which is not your fault, who is responsible for repairs to the 
taxi? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
The driver of the taxi 1 J 
The owner of the taxi 2 
Both owner and driver 3 
! 
I 
Insurance pays 4 
I 
Other (specify) 5 ! 
62. And if an accident is your fault? Who pays for the repairs to the taxi? [DO NOT READ OUT. 
SINGLE MENTION.] 
~ The d,ive, of the taxi 1 : 
The owner of the taxi 2 ! 
Both owner and driver 3 
I 
i 
Insurance pays 4 I 
Other (specify) 5 I 











63. Who pays the vehicle insurance on the taxi? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
The driver of the taxi 1 ! 
The owner of the taxi 2 I 
Both owner and driver 3 I 
Nobody (taxi not insured) 4 I 
Other (specify) 5 I 
64. Who pays for the vehicle license for the taxi? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
The driver of the taxi 1 
The owner of the taxi 2 
Both owner and driver 3 I 
Nobody (taxi has no license) 4 
Other (specify) 5 I 
65. Who pays for traffic fines, e.g. if speeding or overloaded? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE 
MENTION.] 
i 
I The driver of the taxi 1 
The owner of the taxi 2 I 
Both owner and driver 3 I 
Nobody (fines are not paid) 4 I 
Other (specify) 5 I 
66. Who pays for fines for unroadworthy vehicles etc? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
The driver of the taxi 1 
I 
The owner of the taxi 2 I 
Both owner and driver 3 
Nobody (fines are not paid) 4 I 
Other (specify) 5 I 
67. Does your employer ever deduct money from your pay for any of the following: [READ 
OUT. ONE ANSWER PER DEDUCTION. IF MONEY IS BEING DEDUCTED, RECORD THE APPROXIMATE AVERAGE AMOUNT.] 
i 
Deductions for: Regularly Sometimes Never Amount I month 
Medical aid / health care 1 2 3 R 
I Burial fund 1 2 3 R 
I Pension / provident fund 1 2 3 R 
Life insurance 1 2 3 R 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) 1 2 3 R 
-"" 
Car I accident insurance 1 2 3 R 
Other (specify) 1 2 2 R 
68. Does your employer ever make deductions from your pay that you do not agree with? 
I 
YNeOs 1 
2 Go to Q.70 L-____________ ~ __ ~ 
I 1 














69. What was the money deducted for? 
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS 
70. Do you have a contract I agreement with the owner of the taxi you drive? 
!i YNeOs 1 I 2 I Go to Q.75 
~------------~-----
71. Is this a verbal or a written contract I agreement? 
Written contract 1 
I Verbal cont-ra-c-t-+---2---;! Go to Q. 73 
72. If you have a written contract, do you have a copy of this contract? 
1 
2 
73. How often are the wages set out in your contract revised? (DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE 
MENTION.) 
Once a year 1 
Irregularly, when the taxi owner wants changes 2 I 
Never 3 I 
Other (specify) 4 i 
74. How often are the working conditions set out in your contract revised? [SINGLE MENTION.] 
Once a year 1 
Irregularly, when the taxi owner wants changes 2 ! 
: 
Never 3 i 
Other (specify) 4 I 
75. Do you receive a pay slip from your employer? 
Yes 1 GotoQ.77 
2 
76. Have you ever encountered problems, e.g. when trying to open a bank account or take 
out a loan or anything else because you do not have a pay slip? 
77. Does your employer give you any paid leave during the year? 
r-~_:s ________ -+ ___ :~I GotoQ.80 
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18. If yes, how many days of paid leave do you get per year? 
Days 
19. During the paid leave, do you receive the same amount you normally earn from your 
employer? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
80. Does your employer allow you to take unpaid leave during the year? 
I r-_~_:s ____ --t __ ~---jl Go to Q. 82 
81. If yes, how many days of unpaid leave can you take per year? 
Days 
82. Does your employer allow you to take sick leave? 
[k I Go to Q. 85 
83. If yes, how many days of sick leave can you take per year? 
Days 
84. During the sick leave, do you receive the same amount you normally earn from your 
employer? [DO NOT READ OUT. SINGLE MENTION.] 
More 1 I Describe: 
I 
Same amount 2 I 
Less 3 I Describe: 
Nothing 4 I 
85. Generally, are there any problems with your employer if you take any type of leave? 
Go to Q.81 
86. If yes, please describe these problems that result from taking leave 
81. To your knowledge, can female taxi drivers take maternity leave? 
I ~s 1 
No 2 
Don't know 3 
GotoQ.91 
GotoQ.91 
88. How many months maternity leave can female drivers take? 











Months I year 
89. Is this maternity leave paid for? 
i;s 1 
rio 2 GotoQ.91 
I Don't know 3 GotoQ.91 
90. How does pay during maternity leave compare to normal wages? 
I More 1 i Describe: 
Same amount 2 
Less I 3 Describe: 
91. Can male taxi drivers take paternity leave when their partner has given birth? 
Yes 1 
No : Go to Q. 95 
~------------~-----~ 
Don't know 3 Go to Q. 95 
92. How many months paternity leave can male drivers take? 
Months I year 










Go to Q. 95 
94. How does pay during paternity leave for male drivers compare to normal wages? 
More 1 i Describe: 
.-----------+---~--.-.-.-.--.------.--
Same amount 2 I 
Less 3 Describe: 
95. Do you have any kind of insurance which will provide you with some income if you are 
unable to work after an accident? 
I 
YNeOs 1 I 
f-. ------+--2--1. Go to Q. 97 
96. What type of insurance is this? 
97. Are you a member of a trade union or any other type of employee organisation? 
I 
YNeOs 1 I· 
'-. ______ --'--_2----'. Go to Q. 99 
98. If yes, please name the union or organisation you are a member of 
14 










INFORMATION ABOUT EMPLOYER 
99. How many years have you worked for your current employer I the employer you work 
for most of the time? 
Years 
100.If you have worked for more than one employer in the taxi industry, why are you no 
longer working for your last employer? 
101.How would you rate your relationship with your current employer I the employer you 











Go to Q.I04 
Go to Q.I03 
Go to Q.I03 
102.lf your relationship with your current main employer is good or very good, what are 
the reasons for this? 
----------- .. ---.. -- .. ---- ... ----.----------
Go to Q.I04 
103.lf your relationship with your current main employer is bad or very bad, what causes 
problems? 
--------------_ .. _-_ .. _-.. _----
104.Why are you working as an employee in the taxi industry rather than in some other 
sector? 
10S.What do you like about working in the taxi industry? 
106.What do you dislike about working in the taxi industry? 
107.Are there any other comments you would like to make about working in the taxi 
industry? 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 












person/people present during 1nT<~nll<>\A' 
Comments. Note here anything you think we need to know about the circumstances surrounding the 
interview, who was present at the interview, respondent's attitude, etc 
• Who was present during the interview? 
• Was the respondent reluctant to speak freely because of other people present? 
• Did the respondent seem intimidated? 
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